Markov game analysis for attack-defense of power networks under possible misinformation

IEEE Transactions on Power Systems

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 1676-1686

  Ma, Chris Y T ^a   Yau, David K Y ^a,b   Lou, Xin ^a,c   Rao, Nageswara S V ^d  

^a Advanced Digital Science Center   (Singapore)

^b PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^d OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY   (United States)

Author keywords

Markov games; Power system security; Smart grid communication networks

Indexed keywords

DECISION SUPPORTS; ELECTRICITY GRIDS; INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION; MARKOV GAMES; NETWORK INTERDICTION; POWER SYSTEM SECURITY; SMART GRID COMMUNICATIONS; STACKELBERG GAMES;

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES; DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS; ELECTRIC NETWORK ANALYSIS; ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION NETWORKS; PUBLIC WORKS;

TERRORISM;

EID: 84886425139     PISSN: 08858950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2012.2226480     Document Type: Article

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