The co-evolution of social institutions, demography, and large-scale human cooperation

Ecology Letters

Volumn 16, Issue 11, 2013, Pages 1356-1364

  Powers, Simon T ^a   Lehmann, Laurent ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Agriculture; Cooperation; Institutions; Irrigation; Large scale societies; Neolithic Demographic Transition; Punishment; Tragedy of the commons

Indexed keywords

AGRICULTURE; COOPERATION; DEMOGRAPHY; EVOLUTION; HUMAN; INSTITUTIONS; IRRIGATION; LARGE-SCALE SOCIETIES; LETTER; NEOLITHIC DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION; PUNISHMENT; THEORETICAL MODEL; TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS;

AGRICULTURE; COOPERATION; INSTITUTIONS; IRRIGATION; LARGE-SCALE SOCIETIES; NEOLITHIC DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION; PUNISHMENT; TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; DEMOGRAPHY; HUMANS; MODELS, THEORETICAL;

EID: 84885948146     PISSN: 1461023X     EISSN: 14610248     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/ele.12178     Document Type: Article

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