Hybrid Bertrand-Cournot Models of Electricity Markets with Multiple Strategic Subnetworks and Common Knowledge Constraints

Restructured Electric Power Systems: Analysis of Electricity Markets with Equilibrium Models

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 167-192

  Yao, Jian ^a,b   Oren, Shmuel S ^b,d,e   Hobbs, Benjamin F ^c  

^a Berkeley Research Associate   (United States)

^b DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH   (United States)

^c JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d Power System Engineering Research Center (PSERC)   (United States)

^e California Public Utility Commission (CPUC)   (United States)

Author keywords

Bertrand model with common knowledge constraints; Hybrid Bertrand Cournot models of electricity markets and multiple strategic subnetworks and common knowledge constraints; Hybrid subnetwork model two existing models

Indexed keywords

EID: 84885534687     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9780470608555.ch5     Document Type: Chapter

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