Financial transmission rights meet cournot: How TCCs curb market power

Energy Journal

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-23

  Stoft, Steven ^a  

^a THE BRATTLE GROUP   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTRIC GENERATORS; ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; MARKETING;

COURNOT-NASH THEORY;

ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS;

EID: 0032734375     PISSN: 01956574     EISSN: None     Source Type: Trade Journal    
DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol20-No1-1     Document Type: Article

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