A philosophical perspective on the relation between cortical midline structures and the self

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

Volumn , Issue SEP, 2013, Pages

  Musholt, Kristina ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Cortical midline structures; Personal level; Phenomenology; Schizophrenia; Self consciousness; Subpersonal level

Indexed keywords

EID: 84885039705     PISSN: 16625161     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00536     Document Type: Review

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