Self-consciousness and nonconceptual content

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 163, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 649-672

  Musholt, Kristina ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Consciousness; Explicit; Immunity to error through misidentification; Implicit; Nonconceptual content; Perception; Proprioception; Representation; Self consciousness; Self reference; Unarticulated constituents

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875653402     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9837-8     Document Type: Article

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