Diversity of Cooperation in the Tragedy of the Commons

Biological Theory

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 3-6

  Killingback, Timothy ^a   Doebeli, Michael ^b   Hauert, Christoph ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS BOSTON   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Biological Theory; Common Resource; Consumption Level; Excessive Consumer; Public Good

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884590777     PISSN: 15555542     EISSN: 15555550     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/BIOT_a_00019     Document Type: Article

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