Understanding academic journal market failure: The case of Austrian economics

Eastern Economic Journal

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 444-463

  Beaulier, Scott A ^a   Subrick, J Robert ^b  

^a TROY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Austrian economics; Political economy; Sociology of economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884243807     PISSN: 00945056     EISSN: 19394632     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/eej.2012.32     Document Type: Article

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