Empirical strategies in contract economics: Information and the boundary of the firm

American Economic Review

Volumn 91, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 189-194

  Baker, George P ^a   Hubbard, Thomas N ^b  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040483375     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.2.189     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Baker, George P. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement." Journal of Political Economy, June 1992, 100(3), pp. 598-614.
2. Baker, George P. and Hubbard, Thomas N. "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking." National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, MA) Working Paper No. 7634, April 2000a.
3. _. "Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information." Mimeo, Harvard University, 2000b.
4. Chiappori, P. A. and Salante, B. "Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work." Mimeo, University of Chicago, 2000.
5. Grossman, Sanford and Hart, Oliver. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration." Journal of Political Economy, August 1986, 94(4), pp. 691-719.
6. Hart, Oliver. Firms, contracts, and financial structure. Oxford: Clarendon, 1995.
7. Holmstrom, Bengt. "The Firm as a Sub-economy." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, April 1999, 15(1), pp. 74-102.
8. Holmstrom, Bengt and Milgrom, Paul. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Special Issue 1991, 7(0), pp. 24-52.
9. _. "The Firm as an Incentive System." American Economic Review, September 1994, 84(4), pp. 972-91.
10. Klein, Benjamin; Crawford, Robert and Alchian, Armen. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process." Journal of Law and Economics, October 1978, 21(2), pp. 297-326.
11. Rajan, Raghuram G. and Zingales, Luigi. "Power in a Theory of the Firm." Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1998, 113(2), pp. 387-432.
12. Slade, Margaret E. "Multitask Agency and Contract Choice: An Empirical Exploration." International Economic Review, May 1996, 37(2), pp. 465-86.
13. Whinston, Michael D. "Assessing the Property Rights and Transaction-Cost Theories of Firm Scope." American Economic Review, May 2001 (Papers and Proceedings), 91(2), pp. 184-88.
14. Williamson, Oliver E. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations." Journal of Law and Economics, October 1979, 22(2), pp. 233-61.
15. _. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press, 1985.
16. Woodruff, Christopher. "Non-Contractible Investments and Vertical Integration in the Mexican Footwear Industry." Mimeo, University of California-San Diego, 1999.