When is true belief knowledge?

When Is True Belief Knowledge?

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages

  Foley, Richard ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84883911024     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
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References (74)

1. Edmund Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 25 (1963): 121-23.
2. Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 102-18.
3. Ernest Sosa, "Epistemic Presupposition," in Justification and Knowledge, ed. George S. Pappas (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), 79-92.
4. and Ernest Sosa, "How Do You Know?" in Knowledge in Perspective, ed. Ernest Sosa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 19-34.
5. Robert Audi, The Structure of Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
6. Peter Klein, Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).
7. Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).
8. John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986).
9. and Marshall Swain, Reasons and Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981).
10. Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
11. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
12. Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
13. For example, see D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth, and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
14. Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981).
15. David Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 549-67.
16. and Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, esp. chaps. 13-16.
17. See Alvin Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 771-91.
18. and Carl Ginet, "The Fourth Condition," in Philosophical Analysis: A Defense by Example, ed. David F. Austin (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988).
19. Noam Chomsky Rules and Representation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 82.
20. David Lewis, "Scorekeeping in a Language Game," in Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
21. See, for example, Peter Unger, Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975 and 2002).
22. Richard Fumer-ton, Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), esp. chap. 2; and Richard Fumerton, Meta-epistemology and Skepticism (Boston: Rowan and Littlefield, 1996).
23. This is a point that coherence theorists emphasize in order to explain how their theory is compatible with simple observational and memory beliefs being justified. See, for example, Gilbert Harman, Change in View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986).
24. and Keith Leh-rer, Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).
25. More cautiously, their apparent disagreement. "Apparent" because contextualists maintain that knowledge claims are contextually dependent, and as a result it is possible for one person to assert that S knows P and another to assert that she does not know P and for both to be correct. For discussions of contextualism and related issues, see Stewart Cohen, "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Skepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998): 289-306.
26. Cohen, "Contextualism Defended," Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 87-98.
27. Keith DeRose, "Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1992): 913-29.
28. Richard Feldman, "Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions," Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 61-85.
29. Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries; David Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 549-67.
30. James Pryor, "Highlights of Recent Epistemology" British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2001): 95-124.
31. and Peter Unger, "The Cone Model of Knowledge," Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 125-78.
32. Jason Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
33. See also Jeremy Fantl and Matthew Mc-Grath, "Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification," Philosophical Review in (2002): 67-94; and Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, chap. 4.
34. Brian McLaughlin first suggested to me that closeness be thought of as a component of importance.
35. For some other examples of narrow knowledge, see the discussions of introspective, perceptual, and testimonial knowledge in chaps. 21 and 22.
36. A passage from the Aeneid, trans. Allen Mandelbaum, bk. 3, lines 576-91 (New York: Bantam, 1971), describing the cavern of the prophet Sibyl makes this point in a splendidly imaginative way:.
37. See, for example, Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, 106-9.
38. See Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Associa tion 17 (1973-1974): 5-20.
39. and Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson: Perspectives on Truth and Interpretation, ed. Ernest LePore (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 307-19.
40. John Hawthorne first pointed out to me the relevance of this kind of case.
41. James Pryor first suggested to me the idea of formulating the point here in terms of conditions that interfere with the basic conditions of knowledge.
42. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?".
43. Bernard Williams, "Deciding to Believe," in Problems of the Self (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
44. and John Searle, Inten-tionality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 8.
45. See related views in Paul Boghossian, "The Normativity of Content," Philosophical Issues 13 (2003): 31-45.
46. David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 16.
47. Nishi Shaw, "How Truth Governs Belief," Philosophical Review 112 (2003): 447-83.
48. and Michael Lynch, True to Life (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).
49. See Marian David, "Truth as the Epistemic Goal, in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, ed. Matthias Steup (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
50. Michael DePaul, "Value Monism in Epistemology" in Steup, J43 Knowledge, Truth.
51. Ward Jones, "Why Do We Value Knowledge?" American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 423-39.
52. Jonathan Kvanvig, "Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know? Meno Problems and Epistemological Axiology" MOM£ST 81 (1998): 426-51.
53. Jonathan Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
54. Stephen Maitzen, "Our Errant Epistemic Aim," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 869-76.
55. Crispin Sartwell, "Why Knowledge Is Merely True Belief," Journal of Philosophy 88 (1992): 167-80.
56. and Sartwell "Knowledge as Merely True Belief," American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1991): 157-64.
57. Compare with Ward Jones, "The Goods and Motivation of Believing," in The Value of Knowledge, ed. Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 139-62.
58. Compare with Linda Zagzebski, "The Search for the Source of the Epistemic Good," Metaphilosophy 34 (2003): 12-28.
59. See Haddock, Millar, and Pritchard, Value of Knowledge, for a discussion of some of these responses.
60. Compare with Ralph Wedgwood: "[T]he only acceptable explanation of why we should aim at knowledge must be grounded in the more fundamental principle that we should aim at getting to the truth." Wedgwood, "The Aim of Belief," Philosophical Perspectives 16 (2002): 267-97.
61. Wayne Riggs first suggested to me the usefulness of this way of framing the issue.
62. Barry Loewer first pointed out this issue to me.
63. For a general discussion of epistemic closure, see Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries.
64. See esp. Fumerton, Epistemology, 12-32.
65. Unger, Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism; and David Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge," in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 418-45.
66. Peter Klein, Certainty (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981).
67. Again, see Klein, Certainty; also Klein, "Misleading Evidence and the Restoration of Justification," Philosophical Studies 37 (1980): 81-89.
68. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (London: Blackwell, 1974), § 246; II. xi (222).
69. See Tyler Burge on the infallibility of such beliefs, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988): 649-62.
70. See Crispin Wright on positive presumptiveness, "Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy, and Intention," Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 622-34.
71. Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits); Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall), 1989.
72. See, for example, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, "Knowing How," Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 411-44.
73. C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
74. Richard Foley, Working Without a Net (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).