Survival strategies of township governments in rural China: From predatory taxation to land trade

Journal of Contemporary China

Volumn 22, Issue 83, 2013, Pages 755-772

  Takeuchi, Hiroki ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FISCAL REFORM; INCENTIVE; RURAL AREA; RURAL POLITICS; TAX REFORM;

CHINA;

EID: 84883422033     PISSN: 10670564     EISSN: 14699400     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2013.782125     Document Type: Article

References (79)

1. For example, Xiande Li, 'Rethinking the peasant burden: evidence from a Chinese village', Journal of Peasant Studies 30(3&4), (2003), pp. 45-74
2. Justin Yifu Lin, Ran Tao and Mingxing Liu, Rural Taxation and Local Governance Reform in China's Economic Transition: Origins, Policy Responses and Remaining Challenges, Stanford Center for International Development, Working Paper No. 317 (2007).
3. For example, Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
4. Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
5. For example, Linda Chelan Li, 'Working for the peasants? Strategic interactions and unintended consequences in Chinese rural tax reform', The China Journal 57, (2007), pp. 89-106
6. Jean C. Oi, 'Old problems for new leaders: institutional disjunctions in rural China', in Yun-han Chu, Chih-cheng Lo and Ramon H. Myers, eds, The New Chinese Leadership: Challenges and Opportunities after the 16th Party Congress (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 141-155
7. Ray Yep, 'Can "tax-for-fee" reform reduce rural tension in China? The process, progress and limitations', The China Quarterly 177, (2004), pp. 42-70.
8. For example, An Chen, 'The failure of organizational control: changing Party power in the Chinese countryside', Politics and Society 35(1), (2007), pp. 145-179
9. John James Kennedy, 'From the tax-for-fee reform to the abolition of agricultural taxes: the impact on township governments in north-west China', The China Quarterly 189, (2006), pp. 43-59
10. Jean C. Oi and Shukai Zhao, 'Fiscal crisis in China's townships: causes and consequences', in Elizabeth J. Perry and Merle Goldman, eds, Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 75-96
11. Jing Vivian Zhan, 'Strategy for fiscal survival? Analysis of local extrabudgetary finance in China', Journal of Contemporary China 22(80), (2013), pp. 185-203
12. Zhao Shukai, Xianzhen Zhili yu Zhengfu Zhiduhua [Township Governance and the Institutionalization of Governments] (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2010).
13. For example, Mingxing Liu, Juan Wang, Ran Tao and Rachel Murphy, 'The political economy of earmarked transfers in a state-designated poor county in western China: central policies and local responses', The China Quarterly 200, (2009), pp. 973-994
14. Ran Tao, Minxing Liu, Fubing Su and Xi Lu, 'Grain procurement, tax instrument and peasant burdens during China's rural transition', Journal of Contemporary China 20(71), (2011), pp. 659-677
15. Christine Wong, 'Rebuilding government for the 21st century: can China incrementally reform the public sector?', The China Quarterly 200, (2009), pp. 929-952
16. Jing Vivian Zhan, 'Undermining state capacity: vertical and horizontal diffusions of fiscal power in China', Asian Politics and Policy 1(3), (2009), pp. 390-408.
17. For example, Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
18. O'Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China. Of course, there is economic disparity within rural areas, for which various factors may account. See, for example, Jiang Xu, '"Rich brothers" and "poor cousins": the political economy of postreform rural disparity in a Chinese township', Journal of Contemporary China 13(41), (2004), pp. 801-817.
19. Xiang is translated as 'township' and zhen is translated as 'town'. In this article, I follow this rule to note a specific township or town. When indicating xiang or zhen as a general administrative level, I use 'township'.
20. The list of interviewees and the interview questions are available from the author upon request.
21. Thomas B. Gold, 'Guerrilla interviewing among the getihu', in Perry Link, Richard Madsen and Paul G. Pickowitz, eds, Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the People's Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 175-192.
22. See Daniel Kelliher, Peasant Power in China: The Era of Rural Reform, 1979-1989 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).
23. Li Jiange and Han Jun, 'Jiejue wo guo xin jieduan "sannong" wenti de silu' ['A framework to solve the Chinese "agriculture, countryside, and farmers" problem in the new stage'], Neibu Canyue [Inside Reference] 695, (2004), pp. 2-16.
24. Although the central government ordered the reduction of the integrated agricultural tax rate by one percentage point per year, in reality a number of provinces, mostly in central China, reduced their tax rate by three percentage points. Thus, the agricultural tax was phased out completely in many places by 2006.
25. Huang Weirong, 'Pochan xiangzhen mianlin de zhuyao wenti ji duice chutan' ['A preliminary reflection on the main issues that bankrupt townships are facing and their measures'], Xiangzhen Luntan [Township Forum], (11 November 2005), available at: http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID = 41414 (accessed 20 September 2009)
26. Yu Liedong, 'Quanmian quxiao nongye shui dui cunji zuzhi jianshe ji duice: dui Jiangxi Sheng 31 ge cun de diaocha' ['The impact of the complete abolition of the agricultural tax on construction of village-level organizations and their measures: a study of 31 villages in Jiangxi Province'], Xiangzhen Luntan [Township Forum], (11 November 2005), available at: http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID = 41754 (accessed 20 September 2009).
27. Because comprehensive data at the national level of actual implementation of the rural tax reforms and reduced burdens are unavailable, I rely on official reports to examine Wen Jiabao's statement.
28. Li Deqiang and Lei Xiaojun, 'Nongye shui quxiao hou nongcun xin wenti de duice sikao' ['A reflection on measures of the new issues arising after the abolition of the agricultural tax'], Xiangzhen Luntan [Township Forum], (23 October 2005), available at: http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID = 40505 (accessed 20 September 2009).
29. Nanfang Zhoumo [Southern Weekend], (3 September 2004).
30. Thomas P. Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü, Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) ch.3
31. To keep the anonymity of my interviewees, I use fictitious names to describe the localities where I conducted interviews.
32. Jean C. Oi and Shukai Zhao, 'Fiscal crisis in China's townships: causes and consequences', in Elizabeth J. Perry and Merle Goldman, eds, Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 83
33. I refer here to the issue of reducing kuaikuai (township) cadres, not tiaotiao (county) cadres. I do not have data on the personnel of tiaotiao cadres.
34. For the most comprehensive analysis of the township debt issue, see Lynette Ong, 'The political economy of township government debt, township enterprises and rural financial institutions in China', The China Quarterly 186, (2006), pp. 377-400.
35. For example, Maria Edin, 'State capacity and local agent control in China: CCP cadre management from a township perspective', The China Quarterly 173, (2003), pp. 35-52
36. Susan H. Whiting, 'The cadre evaluation system at the grassroots: the paradox of Party rule', in Barry J. Naughton and Dali L. Yang, eds, Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 101-119.
37. Pierre F. Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 117.
38. Pierre F. Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 150.
39. I do not have information about how the remaining 2.1 million yuan was financed.
40. Many of the corporations that paid their industrial and commercial tax in Long Port were located in townships close to Nanchang, the provincial capital of Jiangxi.
41. According to the informant, a new regulation would be applied in 2005. Under the regulation at that time, a business could pay its owed taxes anywhere as long as a receipt indicated payment. However, under the new regulation, 'the tax receipt must indicate which township's tax bureau has received the tax, so there will be no way to collect taxes located in a different township. Thus, one cannot buy taxes anymore'.
42. You-tien Hsing, The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 5-6.
43. For an analysis of villagers losing land by land trade, see Sally Sargeson, 'Villains, victims and aspiring proprietors: framing "land-losing villagers" in China's strategies of accumulation', Journal of Contemporary China 21(77), (2012), pp. 757-777.
44. For an analysis of the local politics of corruption over land in urban areas, see Jiangnan Zhu, 'The shadow of the skyscrapers: real estate corruption in China', Journal of Contemporary China 21(74), (2012), pp. 243-260.
45. For an analysis of homeowners' reactions to the corrupt behavior of local governments and developers in urban areas, see Ngai-ming Yip and Yihong Jiang, 'Homeowners united: the attempt to create lateral networks of homeowners' associations in urban China', Journal of Contemporary China 20 (72), (2012), pp. 735-750.
46. Samuel P. S. Ho and George C. S. Lin, 'Converting land to nonagricultural use in China's coastal provinces: evidence from Jiangsu', Modern China 30(1), (2004), pp. 81-112.
47. For an analysis of the most recent trend of contentious politics over the land sales issue, see Ray Yep, 'Containing land grabs: a misguided response to rural conflicts over land', Journal of Contemporary China 22(80), (2013), pp. 273-291.
48. Keliang Zhu and Roy Prosterman, Securing Land Rights for Chinese Farmers: A Leap Forward for Stability and Growth, Cato Institute Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, Development Policy Analysis (15 October 2007), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract = 1066812 (accessed 27 June 2010).
49. Keliang Zhu and Roy Prosterman, Securing Land Rights for Chinese Farmers: A Leap Forward for Stability and Growth, Cato Institute Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, Development Policy Analysis (15 October 2007), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract = 1066812 (accessed 27 June 2010). p. 5.
50. Peter Ho, 'Who owns China's land? Policies, property rights and deliberate institutional ambiguity', The China Quarterly 166, (2001), pp. 394-421.
51. Keliang Zhu and Roy Prosterman, Securing Land Rights for Chinese Farmers: A Leap Forward for Stability and Growth, Cato Institute Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, Development Policy Analysis (15 October 2007), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract = 1066812 (accessed 27 June 2010). p. 6.
52. Woo Yeal Paik, Political Participation, Clientelism, and State-Society Relations, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2009, p. 211.
53. For his other analysis on the politics of land development in suburban China, seeWooyeal Paik and Kihyun Lee, 'I want to be exploited!: the politics of xiaochanquanfang land development in suburban China', Journal of Contemporary China 21(74), (2012), pp. 261-279.
54. Paik compiles the data from Guotu Ziyuan Nianjian 2003 (National Land Resource Yearbook 2003). In the data, county governments include district (qu,) governments, and township governments include street (jiedao,) governments.
55. Because these are official data, one can easily imagine that the actual land area illegally used would be even larger.
56. The data might double-count land trades between local governments, enterprises and non-enterprise individuals.
57. Yongshun Cai, Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).
58. As a result, according to surveys, villagers and local officials have very different views on their village's socioeconomic conditions, and villagers see local officials as unfairly advantaged. For example, Jie Chen, 'Sociopolitical attitudes of the masses and leaders in the Chinese village: attitude congruence and constraint', Journal of Contemporary China 14(44), (2005), pp. 445-464
59. M. Kent Jennings and Kuang-Hui Chen, 'Perceptions of injustice in the Chinese countryside', Journal of Contemporary China 17(55), (2008), pp. 319-337.
60. Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, 'The politics of lodging complaints in rural China', The China Quarterly 143, (1995), pp. 756-783.
61. Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. O'Brien, 'Villagers and popular resistance in contemporary China', Modern China 22(1), (1996), pp. 28-61.
62. O'Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China. Of course, there is economic disparity within rural areas, for which various factors may account. See, for example, Jiang Xu, '"Rich brothers" and "poor cousins": the political economy of postreform rural disparity in a Chinese township', Journal of Contemporary China 13(41), (2004), pp. 801-817.
63. Yongshun Cai, Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). pp. 8-10.
64. Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, 'Selective policy implementation in rural China', Comparative Politics 31 (2), (1999), pp. 167-186.
65. You-tien Hsing, The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 5-6. chs 5-7.
66. You-tien Hsing, The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 123. chs 5-7.
67. You-tien Hsing, The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 124. chs 5-7.
68. You-tien Hsing, The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 141. chs 5-7.
69. You-tien Hsing, The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 182. chs 5-7.
70. You-tien Hsing, The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 184-185. chs 5-7.
71. You-tien Hsing, The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 133. chs 5-7.
72. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capacities in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
73. For example, Minxin Pei, China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 2006).
74. For example, Jing Vivian Zhan, 'Decentralizing China: analysis of central strategies in China's fiscal reforms', Journal of Contemporary China 18(60), (2009), pp. 445-462.
75. Yongshun Cai, Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). p. 21.
76. For discussion of how the CCP has maintained legitimacy by limited but effective political reforms, see Gunter Schubert, 'One-party rule and the question of legitimacy in contemporary China: preliminary thoughts on setting up a new research agenda', Journal of Contemporary China 17 (54), (2008), pp. 191-204.
77. Lily L. Tsai, Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
78. Yongshun Cai, Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010). p. 10.
79. You-tien Hsing, The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 133. ch. 6.