Between EU actorness and aid effectiveness: The logics of EU aid to Sub-Saharan Africa

International Relations

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 341-355

  Carbone, Maurizio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Actorness; Aid architecture; Aid bureaucracies; Aid effectiveness; Donor coordination; EU development policy; EU Africa relations

Indexed keywords

EID: 84883420754     PISSN: 00471178     EISSN: 17412862     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0047117813497300     Document Type: Article

References (100)

1. In 2010, the European Commission managed about 18 per cent of the total EU aid, whereas the Member States managed the remaining 82 per cent. See Development Assistance Committee (DAC), European Union: Peer Review 2012 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2012).
2. Maurizio Carbone, The European Union and International Development: The Politics of Foreign Aid (London: Routledge, 2007).
3. These interviews were conducted in Brussels in January-March 2008 and in March-April 2010, in Senegal and Gambia in May-June 2009, and in Ethiopia and Djibouti in May-June 2010. Full anonymity was guaranteed to the interviewees.
4. The nature of the EU as a civilian or normative power has dominated the scholarly debate on the role of the EU in the international arena. The literature is vast, but for good reviews and analyses see the following: Richard Whitman (ed.), Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
5. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds), International Relations and the European Union, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
6. Carol A. Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitchett, The New International Actors: The UN and the EEC (London: Macmillan, 1970).
7. Gunnar Sjöstedt, The External Role of the European Community (Farmborough: Saxon House, 1977).
8. David Allen and Michael Smith, 'Western Europe's Presence in the Contemporary International Arena,' Review of International Studies, 16, 1990, pp. 19-37.
9. Christopher Hill, 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role,' Journal of Common Market Studies, 31, 1993, pp. 305-28.
10. Joseph Jupille and James A. Caporaso, 'States, Agency and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics,' in Carolyn Rhodes (ed.), The European Union in the World Community (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 213-29.
11. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (London: Routledge, 2006).
12. Daniel Thomas, 'Still Punching below Its Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in EU Foreign Policy,' Journal of Common Market Studies, 50, 2012, pp. 457-74.
13. Arne Niemann and Charlotte Bretherton, 'EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Actorness and Effectiveness,' International Relations, 27(3), pp.261-275.
14. Sjöstedt, External Role, p. 16.
15. Bretherton and Vogler, European Union.
16. Jupille and Caporaso, 'States, Agency and Rules.'
17. Carbone, European Union.
18. Martijn L.P. Groenleer and Louise G. Van Schaik, 'United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness in the Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol,' Journal of Common Market Studies, 45, 2007, pp. 969-98.
19. Groenleer and Van Schaik, 'United We Stand'.
20. Thomas, 'Still Punching.'
21. For Jupille and Caporaso and for Bretherton and Vogler, this aspect does not seem to play a central role. For Thomas, it constitutes an element of actorness.
22. Thomas, 'Still Punching.'
23. Katie V. Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds), The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
24. For Bretherton and Vogler, it is, whereas for Thomas, it is not.
25. Lindsay Whitfield (ed.), The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
26. For a similar view, see the concept of 'problem-solving effectiveness,' introduced by Young in 1994. Oran R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
27. Arnab Acharya, Ana T. Fuzzo de Lima and Mick Moore, 'Proliferation and Fragmentation: Transactions Costs and the Value of Aid,' Journal of Development Studies, 42, 2006, pp. 1-21.
28. Stephen Knack and Aminur Rahman, 'Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients,' Journal of Development Economics, 83, 2007, pp. 176-97.
29. Iñaki Aldasoro, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele, 'Less Aid Proliferation and More Donor Coordination? The Wide Gap between Words and Deeds,' Journal of International Development, 22, 2010, pp. 920-40.
30. Examples of aid darlings (countries that receive large quantities of aid) are Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Rwanda, Ghana and Burkina Faso. Examples of aid orphans (countries that are generally overlooked by donors) are Chad, Burundi, Guinea and Central African Republic.
31. Arne Bigsten, 'Coordination et utilisations des aides,' Revue d'économie du développpement, 20, 2006, pp. 77-103.
32. Andrew Rogerson, 'Aid Harmonisation and Alignment: Bridging the Gaps between Reality and the Paris Reform Agenda,' Development Policy Review, 23, 2005, pp. 531-52.
33. Whitfield, Politics of Aid.
34. Rachel Heyman, 'From Rome to Accra via Kigali: "Aid Effectiveness" in Rwanda,' Development Policy Review, 27, 2009, pp. 581-99.
35. William Easterly, 'The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid,' Journal of Policy Reform, 5, 2003, pp. 223-50.
36. William Easterly and Claudia R. Williamson, 'Rhetoric versus Reality: The Best and Worst of Aid Agency Practises,' World Development, 39, 2011, pp. 1930-49.
37. Stephen Knack, F. Halsey Rogers and Nicholas Eubank, 'Aid Quality and Donor Rankings,' World Development, 39, 2011, pp. 1907-17.
38. Bigsten, 'Coordination.'
39. Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima and Moore, 'Proliferation.'
40. Paolo De Renzio, David Booth, Andrew Rogerson and Zaza Curran, 'Incentives for Harmonisation and Alignment in Aid Agencies,' ODI Working Paper, 248 (June 2005).
41. Martin Holland and Mathew Doidge, Development Policy of the European Union (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 1.
42. Davina Makhan, Stefan Gänzle and Sven Grimm, 'Conclusions,' in Stefan Gänzle, Sven Grimm and Davina Makhan (eds), The European Union and Global Development: An 'Enlightened Superpower' in the Making? (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 267.
43. Bretherton and Vogler, European Union, p. 136.
44. Holland and Doidge, Development Policy, p. 246.
45. Holland and Doidge, Development Policy.
46. Sybille Scheipers and Daniela Sicurelli, 'Empowering Africa: Normative Power in EU-Africa Relations,' Journal of European Public Policy, 15, 2007, pp. 607-23.
47. Maurizio Carbone, 'The European Union, Good Governance and Aid Coordination,' Third World Quarterly, 31, 2010, pp. 13-29.
48. Jan Orbie, 'The EU's Role in Development: A Full-Fledged Development Actor or Eclipsed by Superpower Temptations,' in Gänzle, Grimm, and Makhan, European Union, pp. 17-36.
49. Karin Arts and Anne K. Dickson (eds), EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
50. Patrick Holden, In Search of Structural Power: EU Aid Policy as a Global Political Instrument (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009).
51. Amelia Hadfield, 'Janus Advances? An Analysis of EC Development Policy and the 2005 Amended Cotonou Partnership Agreement,' European Foreign Affairs Review, 12, 2007, pp. 39-66.
52. Mary Farrell, 'Internationalising EU Development Policy,' Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 9, 2008, pp. 225-40.
53. Carbone, European Union.
54. See the peer reviews published by the DAC, and also the annual updates of the 'Commitment to Development Index' published by the Centre for Global Development, available at: www. cgdev.org
55. Carbone, European Union.
56. Gwénaëlle Corre (ed.), Whither EC Aid? (Maastricht: ECDPM, 2009).
57. Carbone, 'The European Union, Good Governance.'
58. Jan Orbie and Helen Versluys, 'The European Union's International Development Policy: Leading and Benevolent?,' in Jan Orbie (ed.), Europe's Global Role: External Policies of the European Union (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 67-90.
59. Carbone, European Union.
60. See also Jan Orbie, 'EU Development Policy Integration and the Monterrey Process: A Leading and Benevolent Identity?,' European Foreign Affairs Review, 8, 2003, pp. 395-415.
61. In this context, it was also decided that half of those increases would be allocated to sub-Saharan Africa.
62. European Commission, 'Annex: EU Follow-Up to the Barcelona Commitments and Operationalisation of the Monterrey Consensus,' SEC (2004) 246 (5 March 2004).
63. Council of the European Union, Council meeting, General Affairs and External Relations (Brussels, November 2004).
64. C. Rogers, Civilian Harm and Conflict in Northwest Pakistan (Washington, DC: CIVIC 2010) p. 22, available at , accessed 27 July 2011.
65. Heyman, 'From Rome to Accra.'
66. Carbone, European Union.
67. By contrast, EU development policy would remain 'universal' in its reach.
68. Nils-Sjard Schulz, 'Division of Labour among European Donors: Allotting the Pie or Committing to Effectiveness?,' Development in Context 09, May 2007, p. 5.
69. Holger Mürle, 'Towards a Division of Labour in European Development Co-operation: Operational Options,' Discussion Paper, 6 (Bonn: German Development Institute, June 2007).
70. Mürle, 'Towards a Division of Labour.'
71. Schulz, 'Division of Labour.'
72. The FTI, which is overseen by the European Commission and Germany, involves 14 Member States as facilitators in 32 developing countries. The list of participants posed a number of problems, in that it was mainly decided at headquarter level.
73. The European Commission tried to set the agenda also by commissioning some assessments of the costs and benefits of EU donor coordination. A first study, based on a number of crude calculations, estimated that savings would be between €3 and €6 million per year. See HTSPE, The Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach (Brussels: European Commission, 2009). A second study, based on more advanced econometric analysis, concluded that the hypothetical gains from full coordination between EU donors would amount to over €7 million per year. See Soges, The Aid Effectiveness Agenda: The Benefits of Going Ahead (Brussels: European Commission, 2011).
74. The added value of the EU's federator role would be that of creating European rules and standards: 'To put it extremely, the EU could be a major development actor without spending one euro on development aid.' Orbie, 'The EU's Role in Development,' p. 23.
75. Interview in Brussels (April, 2010) with an European Commission official and officials of several EU Member States.
76. European Commission, 'Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change,' COM (2011) 637 (13 October 2011).
77. Interviews in Brussels (March-April 2010) with officials of several EU Member States.
78. European Commission, 'Aid Effectiveness after Accra: Where Does the EU Stand and What More Do We Need to Do?,' SEC (2009) 443 (8 April 2009), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/COMM_NATIVE_SEC_2009_0443_4_Aid-Effectivenessafter-Accra.pdf.
79. European Commission, 'Aid Effectiveness-Annual Progress Report 2010,' SEC (2010) 422 (21 April 2010), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/229a_en.htm.
80. European Commission, 'EU Accountability Report 2011 on Financing for Development,' SEC (2011) 502 (19 April 2011), available at: http://ec.europa. eu/europeaid/how/accountability/eu-annual-accountability-reports/.
81. European Commission, 'EU Accountability Report 2011 on Financing for Development,' SWD (2012) 199 (9 July 2012).
82. This state of affairs was complemented by the limited use of delegated cooperation and joint programming-the two effective ways to address the issue of aid fragmentation-as well as budget support.
83. Gwénaëlle Corre (ed.), Current Dilemmas in Aid Architecture: Actors & Instruments, Aid Orphans and Climate Change (Maastricht: ECDPM, 2008).
84. Interviews in Dakar (May-June, 2009) with officials of several EU Member States.
85. Sarah Delputte and Frederick Söderbaum, 'European Aid Coordination in Africa: Is the Commission Calling the Tune?,' in Gänzle, Grimm and Makhan, The European Union, pp. 37-56.
86. Interviews in Dakar (May-June 2009) and Addis Ababa (May-June 2010) with officials of Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden.
87. Paul Engel and Niels Keijzer, 'In Risk of a Two-Speed Europe,' D+C, 2008, p. 2.
88. By contrast, in the 1990s, while at headquarter level, there was limited progress on coordination and complementarity, on the ground, there seemed to be significant functional coordination, due to the socialisation process between expatriates. Terhi Lehtinen, The Coordination of European Development Cooperation in the Field: Myth or Reality? (Maastricht: ECDPM, 2003).
89. European Commission, 'Aid Effectiveness after Accra,' p. 11.
90. Interviews in Addis Ababa and Djibouti (May-June 2010) with officials of several EU Member States. In reality, what emerged from these interviews is that national aid bureaucrats failed to understand the logic of complementarity and division of labour, which would almost completely eliminate the need to hold coordination meetings.
91. Interviews in Dakar (May-June 2009), Addis Ababa and Djibouti (May-June 2010) with officials of several EU Member States.
92. Interviews in Dakar (May-June 2009) and Addis Ababa (May-June 2010) with officials of the United States, India and the World Bank.
93. Corre, Current Dilemmas.
94. Interviews in Brussels (January 2008) with three European Commission officials.
95. Interviews in Dakar (May-June 2009) and Addis Ababa (May-June 2010) with officials of the governments of Senegal and Ethiopia. See also Maurizio Carbone, 'Better Aid, Less Ownership: Multi-Annual Programming and the EU's Development Strategies in Africa,' Journal of International Development, 20, 2008, pp. 118-229.
96. Interviews in Banjul (May-June 2009) and Djbouti (May-June 2010) with officials of the European Commission, several EU Members States and the governments of Gambia and Djbouti.
97. Interview in Brussels (March 2010) with one European Commission official.
98. Interviews in Dakar (May-June 2009) with officials of the European Commission, several EU Members States and the government of Senegal.
99. Interviews in Addis Ababa (May-June 2010) with officials of the European Commission and several Member States, other international donors and the government of Ethiopia.
100. True, these increases were in some cases related to the promotion of global security and to debt relief, but while in 2000, the aid given by DAC countries was about US$52 billion, in 2010, it reached about US$120 billion.