Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 83, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 176-197

  Knack, Stephen ^a   Rahman, Aminur ^b  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b WORLD BANK GROUP   (United States)

Author keywords

Bureaucratic quality; Foreign aid

Indexed keywords

AID POLICY; BUREAUCRACY; INTERNATIONAL AID;

EID: 33845535864     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.02.002     Document Type: Article

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