A combined framework for modeling the evolution of traveler route choice under risk

Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies

Volumn 35, Issue , 2013, Pages 156-179

  Wang, Guangchao ^a   Ma, Shoufeng ^a   Jia, Ning ^a  

^a TIANJIN UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Dynamical prospect theory; Evolutionary game theory; Route choice

Indexed keywords

DECISION THEORY; GAME THEORY; TIME SWITCHES; TRAVEL TIME;

BOUNDED RATIONALITY; EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY; EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY; PROSPECT THEORY; REPLICATOR DYNAMICS; RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES; ROUTE CHOICE; UNEXPECTED INCIDENTS;

RISK PERCEPTION;

DISCRETE CHOICE ANALYSIS; GAME THEORY; NUMERICAL MODEL; RISK ASSESSMENT; TRAVEL BEHAVIOR; TRAVEL TIME;

EID: 84882628796     PISSN: 0968090X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.trc.2013.06.019     Document Type: Article

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