Constitutional possibility and constitutional evolution

Law, Economics and Evolutionary Theory

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 131-155

  Posner, Eric A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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EID: 84881963847     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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