The achievement of electricity competitive reforms: A governance structure problem?

Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation: Institutional Perspectives

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 196-215

  Glachant, Jean Michel ^a   Perez, Yannick ^b  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS SACLAY   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881861650     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (55)

1. Aoki, Masahiko (2001), Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
2. Baumol, J. William and J. Gregory Sidak (1994), Toward Competition in Local Telephony, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
3. Baldwin, Clariss and Kim Clark (2000), Design Rules: the Power of Modularity, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
4. Brousseau, Eric and Jean-Michel Glachant (eds) (2002), The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Brousseau, Eric and Jean-Michel Glachant (eds) (2008), New Institutional Economics: A Guide book, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Castalia Strategic Advisor (2005), Explanatory Notes on Key Topics in the Regulation of Water and Sanitation Services, Washington, DC: World Bank.
7. Chao, H. and S. Peck (1996), 'A market mechanism for electric power transmission', Journal of Regulatory Economics, 10, 25-59.
8. EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) (2004), Transition Report 2004: Infrastructure, London: EBRD.
9. Finon, D. and Y. Perez (2007), 'Transactional effi ciency and public promotion of environmental technologies: the case of renewable energies in the electric industry', Ecological Economics, 62, 77-92.
10. Glachant, J.-M. and D. Finon (2000), 'Why do the European Union's electricity industries continue to diff er? A new institutional analysis', in C. Menard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, pp. 313-34.
11. Glachant, Jean-Michel and Dominique Finon (eds) (2003), Competition in European Electricity Markets: A Cross Country Comparison, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
12. Glachant, Jean-Michel and François Lévêque (2009), European Union Electricity Internal Market: Towards an Achievement? Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (forthcoming).
13. Glachant, J.-M., U. Dubois and Y. Perez (2008), 'Deregulating with no regulator: is Germany electricity transmission regime institutionally correct?', Energy Policy 36 (5), 1600-10.
14. Green, R., A. Lorenzoni, Y. Perez and M. Pollitt (2008), 'Benchmarking in the European Union, Working Paper University of Cambridge; also in J-M.
15. Glachant and F. Lévêque (2008), European Union Electricity Internal Market: towards an Achievement? Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, (forthcoming).
16. Guash, J. Luis and Pablo T. Spiller (1999), Managing the Regulatory Process: Design, concepts, Issues, and the Latin America and Caribbean Story, Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank.
17. Haggard, S. (2000), 'Interest, institutions and policy reform', in A. O. Krueger (ed.), Economic Policy Reform: The Second Stage, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, pp. 21-61.
18. Hiroux, C. (2004), Shallow Cost and Deep Cost, an assessment, Working Paper GRJM, université Paris-Sud 11.
19. Holburn, Guy and Richard Van den Bergh (2004), 'Infl uencing agencies through pivotal political institutions', Journal of law, Economics and organization, 20 (20), 458-83.
20. Holburn, G. L. F. and P. T. Spiller (2002), 'Institutional or structural: lessons from international electricity sector reforms', in Eric Brousseau and Jean- Michel Glachant (eds), The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 463-502.
21. IEA (International Energy Agency) (2001), Regulatory Institutions in Liberalised Electricity Markets, Paris: AIE OCDE.
22. Joskow, Paul L. and Richard Schmalensee (1983), Markets for Power, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
23. Kessides, I. Nicolas (2004), Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and Competition, A World Bank Policy Research Report, Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press.
24. Levy, B. and P. T. Spiller (1994), 'The institutional foundations of regulatory commitment: a comparative analysis of telecommunications regulation', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 10 (2), 201-46.
25. Levy, Brian and Pablo T. Spiller (eds) (1996), Regulations, Institutions and Commitment. Comparative Studies of Telecommunications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
26. Littlechild, S. (2006), 'Foreword', in F. P. Sioshansi and W. Pfaff enberger Electricity Markets around the World, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
27. Macintyre, Andrew (2003), The Power of Institutions, Political Architecture and Governance, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
28. McCubbins, M. D., R. G. Noll and B. R. Weingast (1987), 'Administrative procedures as instruments of political control', Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 3, 243-77.
29. McCubbins, M. D., R. G. Noll and B. R. Weingast (1989), 'Structures and process, politics and policy: administrative procedures and the political control of agencies', Virginia Law Review, 75, 431-82.
30. Midttun, Atle (2005), 'Deregulation: designs, learning and legitimacy', in John Gronewegen and Rolf Kunneke (eds), Reform of Infrastructure Industries, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
31. Newbery, David (2000), Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
32. Newbery, D. (2002), 'Issues and options for restructuring electricity supply industries', DAE Working Paper WP 0210, University of Cambridge.
33. North, Douglass C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
34. North, Douglass C. (2005), Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton Economic History of the Western World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
35. Ocana, C. (2002), 'Trends in management of regulation: a comparison of energy regulators in member countries of the OECD', International Journal of Regulation and Governance, 3 (1), 13-32.
36. Oren, S. (1997), 'Economic ineffi ciency of passive transmission rights in congested electricity systems with competitive generation', Energy Journal, l (18), 63-83.
37. Ogus, A. (1995), 'Rethinking self-regulation', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 15, 97-108.
38. Pagano, U. (2006), 'Legal position and institutional complementarities', in F. Cafi aggi, A. Nicita and U. Pagano, Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions, London and New York: Routledge.
39. Perez, Y. (2002), Lanalyse néo-institutionnelle des réformes électriques européennes, Thèse de doctorat Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne.
40. Prosser, T. (2005), 'Regulatory contracts and stakeholder regulation', Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 76 (1), 35-57.
41. Rious, V., J-M. Glachant, Y. Perez and P. Desante (2008), 'The diversity of design of TSOs', Working Paper Cambridge and Working Paper MIT.
42. Rufi n, Carlos (2003), The Political Economy of Institutional Change in the Electricity Supply Industry, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
43. Saleth, Maria and Ariel Dinar (2004), Institutional Economics of Water: A Cross- Country Analysis of Institutions and Performance, Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.
44. Sioshansi, Ferejhon P. and Wolfgang Pfaff enberger (eds) (2006), Electricity Markets around the World, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
45. Smeers, Y. (2004), 'TSO, electricity markets and market power', in 'European Regulatory TSO benchmarking conference', Den Haag, May.
46. Spiller, P. T and S. Liao (2008), 'Buy, lobby or sue: interest groups' participation in policy making - a selective survey', in E. Brousseau and J.-M. Glachant, New Institutional Economics: A Guidebook, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
47. Spiller, P. T. and L. V. Martorell (1996), 'How should it be done? Electricity regulation in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile', in R. J. Gilbert and E. P. Kahn (eds): International Comparisons of Electricity Regulation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 82-125.
48. Tsebelis, G. (1995), 'Decision making in political systems: veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartism', British Journal of Political Science, 25 (3), 289-325.
49. Tsebelis, Georges (2002), Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work?, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
50. Weingast, B. R. (1995), 'The economic role of political institutions: market-preserving federalism and economic development', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 11 (1), 269-96.
51. Williamson, Oliver E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press.
52. Williamson, Oliver E. (1996), The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
53. Wilson, R. B. (2002), 'Architecture of electricity power market', Econometrica, 70 (4), 1299-340.
54. World Bank, (1995), Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
55. World Bank, (2006), Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems, Washington, DC: World Bank Edition.