Deregulating with no regulator: Is the German electricity transmission regime institutionally correct?

Energy Policy

Volumn 36, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 1600-1610

  Glachant, Jean Michel ^a   Dubois, Ute ^a   Perez, Yannick ^a  

^a European Chair on Intellectual Capital and RITM University Paris Sud   (France)

Author keywords

Electricity market reform; Regulation of network access; Self regulation

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; COSTS; ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; ELECTRIC LINES; ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION;

ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM; REGULATION OF NETWORK ACCESS; WHOLESALE MARKETS;

ENERGY POLICY;

DEREGULATION; ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY; ELECTRICITY SUPPLY; INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION; VERTICAL INTEGRATION;

CENTRAL EUROPE; EURASIA; EUROPE; GERMANY;

EID: 40949112264     PISSN: 03014215     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2007.10.032     Document Type: Article

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