Development of a virtual power market model to investigate strategic and collusive behavior of market players

Energy Policy

Volumn 61, Issue , 2013, Pages 717-728

  Shafie khah, Miadreza ^a   Parsa Moghaddam, Mohsen ^a   Sheikh El Eslami, Mohamad Kazem ^a  

^a TARBIAT MODARES UNIVERSITY   (Iran)

Author keywords

Collusive behavior; Strategic behavior; Virtual power market

Indexed keywords

COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOR; DYNAMIC GAME THEORIES; ECONOMIC DISPATCH; MULTI-AGENT ENVIRONMENT; REAL WORLD SITUATIONS; SECURITY CONSTRAINT; STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR; VIRTUAL POWER;

COMPUTER SIMULATION; SCHEDULING; WIND POWER;

COMMERCE;

ALGORITHM; ELECTRICITY SUPPLY; ENERGY MARKET; GAME THEORY; NUMERICAL MODEL; POWER PLANT; STRATEGIC APPROACH; WIND POWER;

EID: 84881662743     PISSN: 03014215     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2013.06.003     Document Type: Article

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