Shifting the blame to a powerless intermediary

Experimental Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 306-312

  Oexl, Regine ^a   Grossman, Zachary J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK   (Austria)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Blame shifting; Delegation; Intermediation; Punishment

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881219249     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9335-7     Document Type: Article

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