Impossible worlds and logical omniscience: An impossibility result

Synthese

Volumn 190, Issue 13, 2013, Pages 2505-2524

  Bjerring, Jens Christian ^a  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Impossible worlds; Logical omniscience; Logical reasoning; Rationality; Resource bounded reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881021962     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-0038-y     Document Type: Article

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