"Assertion" and intentionality

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 151, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 87-113

  Stanley, Jason ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Frege's Puzzle; Intentionality; Robert Stalnaker

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956698795     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9588-y     Document Type: Article

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