Douglas on values: From indirect roles to multiple goals

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 375-383

  Elliott, Kevin C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

Cognitive attitudes; Ethics of expertise; Goals of science; Indirect roles; Inductive risk; Science and values

Indexed keywords

EID: 84880944466     PISSN: 00393681     EISSN: 18792510     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.06.003     Document Type: Article

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