Pricing public goods for private sale

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 417-434

  Feldman, Michal ^a   Kempe, David ^b   Lucier, Brendan ^c   Leme, Renato Paes ^c  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Externalities; Network; Pricing; Public good; Revenue maximization

Indexed keywords

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; NETWORKS (CIRCUITS); SALES;

EXTERNALITIES; MULTIPLICITY OF EQUILIBRIA; PRICING MECHANISM; PUBLIC GOODS; REGULAR DISTRIBUTION; REGULAR NETWORKS; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION; UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION;

COSTS;

EID: 84879747675     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2492002.2482594     Document Type: Conference Paper

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