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Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 417-434

Pricing public goods for private sale

Author keywords

Externalities; Network; Pricing; Public good; Revenue maximization

Indexed keywords

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; NETWORKS (CIRCUITS); SALES;

EID: 84879747675     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2492002.2482594     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (19)

References (32)
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    • Putting auction theory to work
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.