Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 768-779

  Bardey, David ^a,b   De Donder, Philippe ^c  

^a UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES   (Colombia)

^b TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

^c Toulouse School of Economics   (France)

Author keywords

Discrimination risk; Informational value of test; Personalized medicine

Indexed keywords

DISEASE; ECONOMICS; HEALTH INSURANCE; MEDICINE; MODELING; RISK ASSESSMENT;

ARTICLE; GENETIC PREDISPOSITION; GENETIC SCREENING; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH INSURANCE; HUMAN; MORAL HAZARD; MORALITY; PROPHYLAXIS; RISK ASSESSMENT; SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION;

D82; DISCRIMINATION RISK; I18; INFORMATIONAL VALUE OF TEST; PERSONALIZED MEDICINE;

ACTUARIAL ANALYSIS; GENETIC TESTING; HUMANS; INDIVIDUALIZED MEDICINE; INSURANCE COVERAGE; INSURANCE, HEALTH; MORALS; PREJUDICE; PRIMARY PREVENTION;

EID: 84879705747     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: 18791646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.04.008     Document Type: Article

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