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Volumn 32, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 768-779

Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard

Author keywords

Discrimination risk; Informational value of test; Personalized medicine

Indexed keywords

DISEASE; ECONOMICS; HEALTH INSURANCE; MEDICINE; MODELING; RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 84879705747     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: 18791646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.04.008     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (25)

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