Genetic testing in competitive insurance markets with repulsion from chance: A welfare analysis

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 25, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 847-860

  Hoel, Michael ^a   Iversen, Tor ^a   Nilssen, Tore ^a   Vislie, Jon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

Author keywords

Genetic testing; Health insurance

Indexed keywords

GENETIC ENGINEERING; HEALTH INSURANCE; HEALTH POLICY; HEALTH RISK;

ANALYTIC METHOD; ARTICLE; ATTITUDE TO HEALTH; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC ASPECT; GENETIC ANALYSIS; GENETIC SCREENING; HEALTH; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH INSURANCE; HIGH RISK POPULATION; HUMAN; HUNTINGTON CHOREA; INFORMATION; MARKET; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; MEDICAL INFORMATION; PROBABILITY; TECHNIQUE; WELFARE; WELLBEING;

ECONOMIC COMPETITION; GENETIC SCREENING; HUMANS; INSURANCE, HEALTH; MODELS, STATISTICAL; NORWAY; SOCIAL WELFARE;

EID: 33747159619     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2005.12.003     Document Type: Article

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