Genetic Information: Comparing Alternative Regulatory Approaches When Prevention Matters

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 23-46

  Barigozzi, Francesca ^a   Henriet, Dominique ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

^b Ecole Centrale Marseille   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78650973560     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01491.x     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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