Mechanism choice

Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 363-396

  Wiener, Jonathan B ^a   Richman, Barak D ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878171506     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781849804899.00020     Document Type: Chapter

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