The price of flexibility: Towards a theory of Thinking Aversion

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 148, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 903-934

  Ortoleva, Pietro ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Choice overload; Contemplation cost; Cost of thinking; Preference for flexibility; Preference over menus

Indexed keywords

EID: 84877633218     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.009     Document Type: Article

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