Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 116, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 189-228

  Sabourian, Hamid ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Automaton; Bargaining; Bounded rationality; Competitive equilibrium; Complexity; Markov equilibrium; Matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 3242724363     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.003     Document Type: Article

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