Domestic drug prohibition as a source of foreign institutional instability: An analysis of the multinational extralegal enterprise

Journal of International Management

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 335-349

  Mudambi, Ram ^a,b   Paul II, Chris ^c  

^a TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF READING   (United Kingdom)

^c GEORGIA SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Domestic market; Extralegal enterprise; Multinational enterprise; Prohibition

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041381085     PISSN: 10754253     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1075-4253(03)00053-X     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. Alchian A. Demstez H. The property rights paradigm J. Econ. Hist. 33 1973 16-27
2. Amit R. Muller E. Cockburn I. Opportunity costs and entrepreneurial activity J. Bus. Venturing 10 1995 95-106
3. Bardhan P. Corruption and development: a review of the issues J. Econ. Lit. 35 1997 1320-1346
4. Baumol W. Entrepreneurship: productive, unproductive and destructive J. Polit. Econ. 98 1990 893-921
5. Becker G. Crimes and punishment: an economic approach J. Polit. Econ. 76 1968 169-217
6. Becker G. Stigler G. Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers J. Legal Stud. 3 1974 1-18
7. Benson B. Kim I. Rasmussen D. Zuehlke T. Is property crime caused by drug use or by drug enforcement? Appl. Econ. 24 1992 679-692
8. Benson B. Rasmussen D. Kim I. Deterrence and public policy: trade-offs in the allocation of police resources Int. Rev. Law Econ. 18 1998 77-100
9. Bertram E. Blackman M. Sharpe K. Andreas P. Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial 1996 University of California Press Berkeley
10. Block M.K. Heineke J.M. A labor theoretic analysis of criminal choice Am. Econ. Rev. 65 3 1975 314-325
11. Buchanan J. Rent seeking and profit seeking. In: Buchanan J. Tollison R. Tullock G. (Eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society 1980 Texas A&M Press College Station
12. Buckley P. The role of management in internalization theory Manag. Int. Rev. 33 3 1993 197-207
13. Buckley P. Casson M. The Future of the Multinational Enterprise 1976 Macmillan London
14. Cabot O. Corruption as a gamble J. Public Econ. 33 1987 233-244
15. Casson M. The Firm and the Market 1987 Basil Blackwell Oxford
16. Chang J. Lai C. Yang C. Casual police corruption and the economics of crime Int. Rev. Law Econ. 20 2000 35-51
17. Coase R. The nature of the firm Economica 4 1937 386-405
18. Congelton R. Efficient status seeking: externalities and the evolution of status games J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 11 1989 175-190
19. Dunning J. Trade, location of economic activity and the multinational enterprise: a search for an eclectic approach. In: Ohlin B. Hesselborn P. Wihkman P. (Eds.), The International Allocation of Economic Activity 1977 Macmillan London, UK
20. Dunning J. Explaining International Production 1988 Unwin Hyman London
21. Dick A. When does organized crime pay? A transaction costs analysis Int. Rev. Law Econ. 15 1995 25-45
22. Fagre N. Wells L. Bargaining power of multinationals and host governments J. Int. Bus. Stud. 13 1982 9-23
23. Funk P. On the optimal use of formal and informal punishment Presented at ASSA Meetings, New Orleans, LA 2000
24. Gibbons R. Game Theory for Applied Economists 1992 Princeton University Press Princeton
25. Gambetta D. Mafia: the price of distrust. In: Gambetta O. (Ed.), Trust Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations 1988 158-175 Blackwell Oxford
26. Gaviria A. Increasing returns and the evolution of violent crime: the case of Colombia J. Dev. Econ. 61 2000 1-25
27. Griffin J.P. Calabrese M.R. Coping with extraterritoriality disputes J. World Trade 22 3 1988 5-25
28. Jost P. Crime coordination and punishment Int. Rev. Law Econ. 21 2001 23-46
29. Klitgaard R. Controlling Corruption 1988 University of California Press Berkeley
30. Lott J. Do we punish high income criminals too heavily? Econ. Inq. 30 4 1992 583-608
31. Lott J. Roberts D. Why comply?: one-sided enforcement of price controls and victimless crime law J. Legal Stud. 18 1989 403-414
32. Mauro P. Growth and corruption Q. J. Econ. 110 1995 681-712
33. Miron J. Violence and the U.S. prohibitions of drugs and alcohol Am. Law Econ. Rev. 1 1999 78-114
34. Mudambi R. The location decision of the multinational enterprise (Chapter 9) In: McCann P. (Ed.), Industrial Location Economics 2002 Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK
35. Murphy K. Shleifer A. Vishny W. Why is rent seeking so costly to growth Am. Econ. Rev. 83 1993 409-414
36. Paul C. Wilhite A. Efficient rent seeking under varying cost structures Public Choice 64 1990 279-290
37. Paul C. Wilhite A. Rent seeking, rent defending and rent dissipation Public Choice 71 1991 61-70
38. Paul C. Wilhite A. Illegal markets and the social cost of rent seeking Public Choice 68 1994 185-194
39. Peltzman S. Toward a general theory of regulation J. Law Econ. 19 2 1976 211-240
40. Reuter P. The decline of the American mafia Public Interest 120 1995 89-99
41. Rivers W. Politics, ethics and corporate policy: U.S. corporations 1986 position paper on South Africa J. Bus. Commun. 37 2000 369-407
42. Rubin P. The economic theory of the criminal firm. In: Rottenberg S. The Economics of Crime and Punishment (Ed.), 1973 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Washington
43. Rugman A. Gestrin M. The strategic response of multinational enterprises to NAFTA Columbia J. World Bus. 29 1993 18-28
44. Stigler G. The theory of economic regulation Bell J. Econ. Manage. Sci. 2 1971 3-21
45. The Economist, 2002a. Crime without punishment, 36 (January 12)
46. The Economist, 2002b. Where racketeers rule, 34 (February 2)
47. The Economist, 2002c. Colombia's peace process: not looking good 32 (February 9)
48. The Economist, 2002d. Drugs in the Andes: specters stir Peru 33-34. (February 16)
49. Tullock G. The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies and theft West. Econ. J. 5 1967 224-232
50. Wei S.-J. How taxing is corruption on international investors? Rev. Econ. Stat. 82 1 2000 1-11