The design of teacher incentive pay and educational outcomes: Evidence from the New York City bonus program

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 409-420

  Goodman, Sarena F ^a   Turner, Lesley J ^b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84877256249     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/668676     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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