Reciprocal insurance among Kenyan pastoralists

Theoretical Ecology

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 173-187

  Dixit, Avinash K ^a   Levin, Simon A ^a   Rubenstein, Daniel I ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Insurance; Kenya; Pastoralism; Self enforcement; Variable rainfall

Indexed keywords

NOMADIC PEOPLE; PASTORALISM; RAINFALL; RECIPROCITY;

KENYA;

BOS;

EID: 84876431782     PISSN: 18741738     EISSN: 18741746     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s12080-012-0169-x     Document Type: Article

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