Why banks are not too big to fail - evidence from the CDS market

Economic Policy

Volumn 28, Issue 74, 2013, Pages 335-369

  Barth, Andreas ^a,b,c   Schnabel, Isabel ^a,b,c  

^a JOHANNES GUTENBERG UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b GSEFM ^*  (United States)

^c Institut für Mathematik   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANKING; CREDIT PROVISION; DEBT; RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 84876338720     PISSN: 02664658     EISSN: 14680327     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0327.12007     Document Type: Article

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