Market discipline and too-big-to-fail in the CDS market: Does banks' size reduce market discipline?

Journal of Empirical Finance

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 195-210

  Völz, Manja ^a   Wedow, Michael ^a  

^a DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK   (Germany)

Author keywords

CDS spreads; Market discipline; Too big to fail; Too big to rescue

Indexed keywords

EID: 79951960377     PISSN: 09275398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2011.01.001     Document Type: Article

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