Misdemeanors

Southern California Law Review

Volumn 85, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 1313-1376

  Natapoff, Alexandra ^a  

^a LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84875165168     PISSN: 00383910     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (246)

1. Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, THE ECONOMIST, July 22, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16636027.
2. Tim Lynch, Population Bomb Behind Bars, CATO INSTITUTE (Feb. 20, 2000), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/population-bomb-behind-bars.
3. BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, THE HERITAGE FOUND., WITHOUT INTENT: HOW CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW (2010), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf-media/2010/pdf/WithoutIntent- lo-res.pdf.
4. Compare John J. Di Iulio, Jr., Prisons Are a Bargain, By Any Measure, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1996, at A17
5. with John DiIulio, Jr., Two Million Prisoners Are Enough, WALL ST. J., March 12, 1999, at A14.
6. U. S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 - STATISTICAL TABLES 3 tbl.1.1(2009), available at http://bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf.
7. In 2010, over 1.6 million people were incarcerated in prisons, almost 785, 000 in jails. Approximately 62 percent of jail inmates are awaiting court action (that is, not yet convicted), while the rest are either serving a misdemeanor or, less often, a felony sentence. PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRISON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2010 1-3(2012), available at http://bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf;
8. TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2010 - STATISTICAL TABLES 1-2(2011), available at http://bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim10st.pdf. See infra Part II. B.
9. According to the National Center for State Courts, approximately 80 percent of state caseloads are misdemeanors. R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 47(2010), available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/ Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx.
10. ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 7(2009), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/ misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf.
11. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979) (describing thin process in New Haven misdemeanor courts);
12. Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1157, 1172-74 (2004) (describing lack of due process in New York lower court system).
13. Of course the felony world also often fails to live up to the ideal. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835 (1994) (describing the lack of effective lawyering for poor capital defendants). The innocence movement has challenged the assumption that adjudicative principles operate properly even in the most serious cases. See infra Part V. A.;
14. Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143 (2011) (arguing that the trial fact-finding process does not actually meet the high epistemic standards or produce the certitude that trials are supposed to have).
15. Samuel Gross, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927, 940-42 (2008).
16. For a rare exploration of the innocent misdemeanor problem, see Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1162 (2008) (describing the threat of wrongful misdemeanor conviction even though Bowers believes that most misdemeanants are in fact guilty, but arguing that most innocent misdemeanants are better off pleading guilty in light of the costs and risks of litigation).
17. See Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA'S NEW DEATH PENALTY? (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat, eds., forthcoming) (describing physical, psychological, and social destruction imposed by long-term incarceration), available at http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1845904.
18. Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N. Y. U. L. REV. 457, 489-95, 514 n. 331 (2010).
19. See, e.g., 20 U. S. C. § 1091 (r) (1) (2006) (imposing ineligibility for federal student aid as a penalty for drug offenses).
20. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text; U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2010);
21. U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2010);
22. Nichols v. United States, 511 U. S. 738 (1994).
23. Unless otherwise noted, the term ?innocence' in this piece refers to ?actual' or ?factual' innocence, that the defendant did not actually commit the crime, as opposed to what is sometimes called ?legal innocence', that the conviction was legally flawed. See Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N. C. L. REV. 1083, 1086-87 (2011) (criticizing focus on factual innocence).
24. This can be seen as a systemic expression of the behavioral phenomenon that fact finders are more willing to convict for lesser crimes based on less evidence. Ehud Guttel & Doron Teichman, Criminal Sanctions in the Defense of the Innocent, 110 MICH. L. REV. 597, 598-601 (2012) (describing empirical evidence that fact finders demand weightier evidence as the severity of the sanction increases).
25. This is a corollary, not a contradiction, to William Stuntz's point that strong criminal procedures distort enforcement decisions in ways that may harm the poor and the innocent. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L. J. 1, 52-65 (1997).
26. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995).
27. THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN: FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006(2010), available at http://bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf;
28. SEAN ROSENMERKEL, MATTHEW DUROSE & DONALD FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 - Statistical Tables 1(2009), available at http://bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf.
29. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1717 tbl.3 (2010)
30. Bridget McCormack, Economic Incarceration, 25 WINDSOR Y. B. OF ACCESS TO JUST. 223, 228 (2007).
31. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: TABLE 29, ESTIMATED NUMBER OF ARRESTS, UNITED STATES, 2009(2010), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table-29.html;
32. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, ARRESTS, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/ cius2009/arrests/index.html
33. Ray Rivera & Al Baker, Data Elusive on Low-Level Crime in New York City, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2010/11/02/nyregion/02secrecy.html?-r=1&pagewanted=all.
34. PETER BRIEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TECHNICAL BRIEF: REPORTING BY PROSECUTORS' OFFICES TO REPOSITORIES OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS 1-3(2005), available at http://bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rporchr.pdf.
35. DORIS J. JAMES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES, 2002(2004), available at http://bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/content/pub/ pdf/pji02.pdf.
36. Mosi Secret, N. Y. C. Misdemeanor Defendants Lack Bail Money, N. Y. Times, Dec. 2, 2010, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/ nyregion/03bail.html (discussing the findings of a 2010 Human Rights Watch report).
37. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover-0.pdf.
38. Douglas Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1732-33 (2002).
39. Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, 26 CRIM. JUST. 12, 15-16 (2011).
40. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT: A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA'S PRISONS 7(2006), available at http://www.vera.org/download ?file=2845/Confronting-Confinement.pdf.
41. NAT'L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM'N, REPORT 41(2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf (finding that 3.2 percent of surveyed jail inmates reported sexual abuse).
42. Megan Garvey & Stuart Pfeifer, Jail Inmates Were Stripped to Deter Riots, L. A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/18/ local/me-sheriff18.
43. Jonathan Abel, Staph Infection Sends Pinellas Jail Inmate into Coma, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2008/02/27/ Northpinellas/Staph-infection-sends.shtml.
44. PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-19 (2009).
45. Nichols v. United States, 511 U. S. 738, 742-43 (1994).
46. See U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1. 1 (b) - (c) (imposing up to two additional criminal history points for misdemeanor sentences);
47. U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5. A (providing the sentencing table).
48. Jim Dwyer, Side Effects of Arrests for Marijuana, N. Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/nyregion/push-for- marijuana-arrests-in-ny-has-sideeffects.html.
49. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (determining that there is no right to counsel where misdemeanant was not sentenced to incarceration);
50. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, 73-74 (1970) (providing that there is no right to jury trial for ?petty offense' carrying six month penalty or less).
51. See generally Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Op-Ed, Paying a Price, Long After the Crime, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/opinion/paying-a-price-long-after-the-crime. html (proposing expiration dates for criminal records).
52. DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 34 (2007).
53. See also MIRIAM AUKERMAN, MCOLES TRAINING PROGRAM, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: A LEGAL OUTLINE FOR MICHIGAN 2(2008), available at http://www.sado.org/content/guides/collateral.pdf (providing insight into the effects of a conviction in Michigan).
54. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 181 (1965).
55. TEX FAIR DEF. PROJECT, WHAT YOU DON'T KNOW CAN HURT YOU, available at http://www.fairdefense.org/why-lawyer.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) (describing the consequences of a misdemeanor conviction in Texas in an educational pamphlet written by the Texas Criminal Justice Coalition and the Texas Fair Defense Project).
56. Several states disenfranchise misdemeanants while they are incarcerated. ALEC EWALD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A CRAZY-QUILT' OF TINY PIECES: STATE AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAW 3-10(2005), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fdcrazyquilt.pdf Many more misdemeanants are functionally disenfranchised due to official misunderstandings of election law.
57. ERIKA WOOD & RACHEL BLOOM, ACLU & BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST, DE FACTO DISENFRANCHISEMENT 2-3(2008), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/ publications/09.08. DeFacto. Disenfranchisement.pdf (discussing de facto as opposed to de jure disenfranchisement of misdemeanants).
58. 20 U. S. C. § 1091 (r) (1) (2006);
59. Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N. Y. U. L. REV. 457, 514, 514 n. 331 (2010).
60. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 581 (2003).
61. John B. Mitchell & Kelly Kunsch, Of Driver's Licenses and Debtor's Prison, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 439, 443 (2005).
62. Nichols v. United States, 511 U. S. 738, 742-43 (1994) (finding that the use of prior uncounseled conviction to enhance sentence where prior conviction did not result in prison sentence and therefore did not violate Sixth Amendment). The Guidelines exempt some minor offenses from the sentencing calculation.
63. U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1. 2 (c) (2010) (exempting, among other things, hitchhiking, loitering and vagrancy offenses).
64. Cf. Pattershall v. Jenness, 485 A.2d 980, 984 (Me. 1984) (refusing to give collateral estoppel effect to misdemeanor assault conviction in a civil case in part because the defendant ?may... have lacked the incentive to fully and vigorously litigate because of the likelihood of only a small fine being imposed').
65. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 560 (2003).
66. See, e.g., W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re Winship, Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117 (2011) (arguing that stigma constitutes the defining line between civil and criminal punishment, and discussing extant research on stigma).
67. A developing literature addresses the varying subjective experiences of punishment, depending on the baselines from which defendants start and some account for the ways people adapt to punishment over time. See generally John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Retribution and the Experience of Punishment, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1463 (2010) (arguing that adaptation is relevant to punishment);
68. Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009) (arguing that the sensitivity of the offender affects the harshness of the punishment they receive). While the issue of how the misdemeanor experience affects different defendants (for example, privileged defendants like Paul Butler as compared to underprivileged defendants such as Alika) is beyond the scope of this paper, this subjectivity literature could shed valuable light on how the misdemeanor process initiates poor people into the criminal system.
69. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 351-52 (2001).
70. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 364 (1978) (describing prosecutorial function).
71. See also Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31-32 (2002) ("Of course all prosecutors ?screen' when they make any charging decision.').
72. Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 212-13 (1964) (holding that the right to counsel is triggered by formal charges, or the arraignment).
73. But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (holding that misdemeanor defendant who was not subject to "actual imprisonment" upon conviction was not constitutionally entitled to trial counsel).
74. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2467 (2004) (analyzing how plea bargaining is affected by the "shadow of trial', meaning the strength of evidence and expected punishment following trial).
75. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
76. Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461 (2007).
77. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat, Introduction to WHEN LAW FAILS: MAKING SENSE OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 1, 1 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2009).
78. See, e.g., Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1, 41 (2000) (noting that misdemeanor conviction rates for the City of Los Angeles, Kings County, New York, and Riverside County, California, were at 50 percent or lower between 1990 and 1994).
79. Although the presumption that official recordkeeping is accurate is contested. See Herring v. United States, 555 U. S. 135, 137-38 (2009) (documenting error in a police database regarding a warrant resulting in defendant's arrest);
80. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U. S. 191, 195-97 (2008) (describing how the government relied on erroneous records to conclude that the defendant was a felon, jailed him for three weeks, and lodged criminal charges against him for six months until his lawyer finally produced records establishing that he was not a felon).
81. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 238 (1983).
82. The Supreme Court tolerates numerous deviations from this rule. E.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U. S. 164 (2008) (upholding arrest where police arrested suspect based on probable cause for offense for which state law did not authorize arrest);
83. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U. S. 146 (2004) (upholding arrest where there was probable cause to believe that defendant committed offense but police actually arrested him for an entirely unrelated matter for which there was no probable cause);
84. Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797 (1971) (upholding search incident to arrest where police had probable cause to arrest defendant but mistakenly arrested wrong person).
85. Most recently, the Court has suggested in dicta that even mistakes in the probable cause determination itself may not doom an arrest. Herring v. United States, 555 U. S. 135, 139 (2009) ("When a probablecause determination was based on reasonable but mistaken assumptions, the person subjected to a search or seizure has not necessarily been the victim of a constitutional violation. The very phrase ?probable cause' confirms that the Fourth Amendment does not demand all possible precision.').
86. Cf. Jonathan Simon, Recovering the Craft of Policing: Wrongful Convictions, the War on Crime, and the Problem of Security, in WHEN LAW FAILS: MAKING SENSE OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 115, 120-21 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2009) (arguing that war on drugs has created an environment encouraging police to pick suspects from a large precriminalized population).
87. See, e.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, GOOD COPS: THE CASE FOR PREVENTATIVE POLICING (2005) (promoting preventative policing as an important and successful way to achieve public safety);
88. Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct "Outside the Legitimate Investigative Sphere", 94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 620 (2006) (distinguishing between order-maintenance preventative policing and traditional investigative policing that requires evidence).
89. Some argue that this overbreadth is in the very nature of policing, and that police have long been asked to maintain social order in ways that exceed the question of whether a specific crime has been committed. Compare Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 575-78 (1997) (discussing community policing authority)
90. with MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 82 (2005) (arguing that the state's police power originates in the authority of the father over the household and is essentially an alegitimate exercise of power rather than a law-bound effort to achieve justice). Dubber's work is discussed infra Part IV.
91. Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 184 (2008)
92. (citing M. Chris Fabricant, Rousting the Cops, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 30, 2007, http://www.villagevoice.com/2007-10-30/news/rousting-the-cops/).
93. See BALT. CITY CODE art. 19, § 25-1 (2008) (defining the offense of loitering in the Police Ordinances of the City of Baltimore).
94. PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE'S EASTERN DISTRICT 114-15 (2008).
95. See also Edward Ericson, Jr., Copping Out: A City Council Report on False Arrests by Baltimore Police Fails to Address the Root of the Problem, BALT. CITY PAPER (Oct. 5, 2005), http://www2.citypaper.com/news/story.asp?id=10980 (reporting 1800 arrests every month for loitering where formal charges are never filed).
96. Williams v. State, 780 A.2d 1210, 1218 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
97. See generally Reed Collins, Note, Strolling While Poor: How Broken-Windows Policing Created a New Crime in Baltimore, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 419 (2007) (describing Baltimore's aggressive campaign of misdemeanor arrests, including arrests for loitering, and how it targets troubled neighborhoods).
98. A potentially similar class of cases is the California "lewd conduct in public" prosecutions in which police invite sexual encounters with gay men in restrooms and then arrest them, even though under California law such conduct is technically not a crime. See People v. Lake, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 452, 458-59 (2007) (reversing conviction for soliciting lewd or dissolute conduct in a public place because state failed to prove that a third party was likely to be present at the encounter);
99. Megan Barnes, Undercover Decoys Targeting Calif. Gay Men?, EDGE BOSTON (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.edgeboston. com/index.php?ch=news&sc=&sc2= news&sc3=&id=117437 (describing police targeting practices against gay men).
100. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 457, 476 (2000) (noting that as the volume of order maintenance arrests rose in New York, "the evidentiary quality of arrests suffered"). Fagan infers that the arrests were evidentiarily weak because "the rate at which prosecutors declined to pursue these cases rose dramatically. In 1998, prosecutors dismissed 18, 000 of the 345, 000 misdemeanor and felony arrests, approximately twice the number dismissed in 1993.' Id.
101. Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest (s) and Fourth Amendment Enforcement, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1496 (citing data from the New York Police Department Stop, Question and Frisk Database, 2006). These categories are not mutually exclusive.
102. GREG RIDGEWAY, RAND CORP., ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT'S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES 10(2007), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical-reports/2007/RAND-TR534.pdf (comparing numbers of stops and numbers of resulting arrests or summons).
103. Beth Caldwell, Criminalizing Day-to-Day Life: A Socio-Legal Critique of Gang Injunctions, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 241, 246, 250-53 (2010) (describing the impact of broad gang injunctions in Oakwood, Venice).
104. See Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651 (2002) (exploring the link between racial profiling, highway searches, and drug enforcement).
105. David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 296 (2001).
106. See generally Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L. J. 69 (2011) (describing the Supreme Court's increased tolerance for police mistakes of law as well as fact in the probable cause determination).
107. Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 4-15 (2010) (cataloguing widespread evidence of police lies).
108. Myron Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1050 (1987).
109. E.g., I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L. J. 835, 869 (2008) ("To arrest people they suspect are guilty of dealing drugs, they falsely assert that the defendants had drugs in their possession when, in fact, the drugs were found elsewhere where the officers had no lawful right to be.") (quoting the Mollen Commission Report);
110. Morgan Cloud, Judges, 'Testilying', and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1996);
111. Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996).
112. Russell Covey, Mass Exoneration Data and the Causes of Wrongful Convictions 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1881767.
113. The law privileges prosecutorial legal decisionmaking over that of police. E.g., Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that a police officer who received mistaken legal advice from the Assistant District Attorney before making unconstitutional arrest was presumptively entitled to qualified immunity).
114. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 22-23 (2007).
115. See Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1981)
116. (establishing rebuttable presumption that a prosecutor exercises independent judgment in deciding to file criminal charges, thus immunizing investigating officers from liability for injuries suffered after the charging decision), overruled on other grounds by Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir. 2008).
117. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 794 (1977).
118. See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 364 (1978) ("In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion. ").
119. Daniel Medwed, Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision and the Innocence Revolution, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2187, 2204 (2010).
120. The federal system has relatively high declination rates: at the height, 93 percent of civil rights cases referred to the Department of Justice in 1999 were declined for prosecution, whereas a mere 3.4 percent of immigration cases referred by the INS were declined. Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 764-65 (2003).
121. Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System: Prepared for the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security 6, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Wayne S. McKenzie, Director, Prosecution & Racial Justice Program, Vera Institute of Justice), available at http://judiciary. house.gov/hearings/pdf/McKenzie091029.pdf.
122. see also Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 162-64 (2008) (discussing the Vera Institute study).
123. Ford Fessenden & David Rohde, Dismissed Before Reaching Court, Flawed Arrests Rise in New York, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/23/nyregion/dismissed-before-reaching-court- flawed-arrests-rise-innew-york.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
124. Ben Kempinen, The Ethics of Prosecutor Contact with the Unrepresented Defendant, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1147, 1179 (2006) ("[T]he filing of a charge with no basis in fact violates no ethical rule if the prosecutor is personally ignorant of the lack of factual support. Applied to the high volume practice of many urban communities, it would violate no ethical rule if a prosecutor, faced with a large number of referrals and insufficient time to review them, ordered his secretary or paralegal assistant to prepare charging documents for whatever offense the police chose to base their arrest upon without ever reading the referrals.').
125. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367 (1979).
126. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U. S. 654, 658 (2002).
127. See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972) (explaining that right to counsel applies to misdemeanors generally).
128. AM. BAR ASS'N, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 22-23 (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE], http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal-aid-indigent- defendants/ls-sclaid-def-bp-right-to-counsel-in-c riminal-proceedings. authcheckdam.pdf.
129. NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS'N, A RACE TO THE BOTTOM: SPEED & SAVINGS OVER DUE PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS ii (2008) [hereinafterRACE TO THE BOTTOM], http://www.mynlada.org/michigan/michigan-report.pdf.
130. SEAN ROSENMERKEL, MATTHEW DUROSE & DONALD FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 - STATISTICAL TABLES 25 tbl.4.1(2009), available at http://bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ fssc06st.pdf;
131. See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983);
132. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L. J. 1979 (1992);
133. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004).
134. See Shawn D. Bushway & Allison D. Redlich, Is Plea Bargaining in the "Shadow of the Trial" a Mirage, 28 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 437, 449-52 (2011) (demonstrating that strength of evidence does not drive plea bargains);
135. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, ADAM II: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 15(2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/ policy-and-research/adam2008.pdf (finding that between 49 to 87 percent of male arrestees in a 2007 sample tested positive for drug use upon arrest).
136. OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U. S. DEP'T OF EDUC, LITERACY BEHIND PRISON WALLS xviii, 17(1994), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs94/ 94102.pdf
137. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006) (finding that over half of all prison and jail inmates had a mental health problem, including almost 500, 000 in local jails).
138. JENNIFER C. KARBERG & DORIS J. JAMES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE, ABUSE, AND TREATMENT OF JAIL INMATES, 2002(2005), available at http://bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sdatji02.pdf
139. The majority of felony defendants in state court (approximately 80 percent) cannot afford counsel. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1(2000), available at http://bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf
140. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 418 tbl.5.17 (2003).
141. United States v. Diaz-Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653, 654-58 (9th Cir. 2011).
142. Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748 (1970) ("Central to the plea and the foundation for entering judgment against the defendant is the defendant's admission in open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment. He thus stands as a witness against himself.').
143. But see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 37 (1970) (noting that typically a defendant's trial waiver, and not his "express admission of guilt', is the only constitutional requirement for the entry of a conviction since the law accepts pleas of nolo contendere).
144. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 322 (documenting the "special fears and forms of intimidation that can lead non-whites... to agree to cooperate with police;);
145. Andrew Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2260 (2002) (describing stories of African Americans experiencing such negative feelings toward the police).
146. E.g., Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 211 (2002).
147. Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 558-61 (1992) (documenting the lack of a "culture of claiming' on the part of poor women of color).
148. MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA ix (2011) (noting U. S. Department of Justice estimate that "one in three black baby boys born in 2001 will spend part of his life as an inmate in a state or federal prison').
149. PETER BRIEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TECHNICAL BRIEF: REPORTING BY PROSECUTORS' OFFICES TO REPOSITORIES OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS 1(2005), available at http://bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rporchr.pdf.
150. Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 693 (2007) (describing structural impediments to appellate and collateral review of misdemeanor convictions).
151. See generally Charles Short, Note, Guilt by Machine: The Problem of Source Code Discovery in Florida DUI Prosecutions, 61 FLA. L. REV. 177 (2009) (surveying litigation over breathalyzer reliability in numerous states).
152. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 235 (1983)
153. (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U. S. 339, 348 (1813)).
154. See AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 4 (2009) (describing the casual lawlessness of many courts).
155. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367, 371-74 (1979) (holding that there is no right to counsel for misdemeanants who are not sentenced to incarceration).
156. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 159-62 (1968).
157. The Court's approach to misdemeanors has been piecemeal. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 322 (2001) (describing common law requirement that misdemeanor take place in presence of police before police can arrest);
158. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740, 754 (1984) (holding that the minor quality of offense did not permit warrantless home entry);
159. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 36-37 (1972) (noting that merely because offense is petty does not justify imprisonment without counsel at trial);
160. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 520-38 (1884) (explaining requirement of grand jury indictment for serious but not minor cases).
161. The provision of counsel has traditionally been the Court's bedrock response to the threat of inaccuracy. See, e.g., Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U. S. 654, 665 (2002) (asking whether a defendant may be jailed without a "conviction credited as reliable because the defendant had access to ?the guiding hand of counsel"');
162. United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 236-43 (1967) (establishing right to counsel at postindictment lineups to ensure integrity of evidence and fair trial);
163. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (establishing that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that states provide counsel to satisfy defendant's right to fair and accurate trial).
164. Stephanos Bibas, Exacerbating Injustice, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53, 56 (2008) ("Bowers is mistaken to view all of criminal justice as a utilitarian calculus.").
165. See Ronald Wright, Guilt Pleas and Submarkets, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNumbra 68, 68-73 (2008).
166. Cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (conferring new legal salience on noncriminal immigration consequences of pleading guilty).
167. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L. J. 675 (2011) (arguing that Padilla makes all collateral consequences of convictions more legally significant).
168. This debate is already in full force in the capital context. E.g., Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 65, 68-73 (2008) (arguing that capital error rates are relatively low and that the costs of avoiding them are higher than is generally acknowledged);
169. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705-06 (2005) (arguing that the state may be obligated to impose the death penalty if it deters murder and therefore saves innocent lives).
170. But see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 596 (2005) (challenging the utilitarian analysis).
171. See generally M. Chris Fabricant, War Crimes and Misdemeanors: Understanding "Zero-Tolerance" Policing as a Form of Collective Punishment and Human Rights Violation, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 373 (2011) (considering the effects of zero-tolerance policing).
172. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U. S. 451, 467-68 (2001) (Scalia, J, dissenting) (describing the maxim nulla poena sine lege (no punishment without law) as "one of the most ?widely held valuejudgment[s] in the entire history of human thought");
173. Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 310-16 (2004) (theorizing requirements for legitimate punishment once culpability has been established). There remains a more general debate over whether legality is a necessary condition of legal systems, or whether legality is required for moral systems of law.
174. See Jeremy Waldron, Positivism and Legality: Hart's Equivocal Response to Fuller, 83 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1135, 1136-44 (2008) (describing competing positions).
175. David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of Law, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 809, 809 (2006).
176. See also Anne M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REV. 1599, 1612 (2009) ("[W]ithout the substantive criminal law... policing would be unintelligible.'). Other approaches to legitimacy turn less on the nature of rules and legal systems and more on public perceptions of legal authority.
177. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minorities Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 216 (2008) ("[Legitimacy is] the perceived obligation to comply with both civil and criminal law and to defer to decisions of legal authorities. Legitimacy is a socially and morally salient belief to which social authorities can appeal to gain public deference and cooperation. ').
178. R. A. Duff, et al., Introduction: The Boundaries of the Criminal Law, in THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 3 (R. A. Duff, et al. eds., 2010).
179. See LARRY ALEXANDER, KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN & STEPHEN J. MORSE, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 263-87 (2009) (proposing a "culpability-based criminal code').
180. See Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1501, 1537 (2001) (describing the law of evidence as those rules designed to "increase the frequency with which truth [about guilt] is ascertained" and arguing that this "veritistic" question "is the question all evidence scholarship should be asking");
181. Harris v. United States, 404 U. S. 1232, 1233 (1971) ("It is beyond question, of course, that a conviction based on a record lacking any relevant evidence as to a crucial element of the offense charged would violate due process.").
182. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008) (examining data about defendants exonerated by postconviction DNA testing);
183. Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549 (responding to criticisms of the focus on innocence in criminal law).
184. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 175-200 (2009).
185. Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 456-63 (2001) (same).
186. PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 8-12 (1997) (advocating a functional approach to drafting criminal law).
187. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U. S. 451, 467-68 (2001) (Scalia, J, dissenting) (describing the maxim as "one of the most ?widely held value-judgment[s] in the entire history of human thought"').
188. See Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 625-28 (Cal. 1970) (emphasizing legislative supremacy in the determination of the criminal law)
189. superseded by statute on other grounds, CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2012);
190. See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008) (discussing overcriminalization, the important constraints on criminal sanction, and the great injustice of overpunishment);
191. Darryl K. Brown, Can Criminal Law Be Controlled?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 971, 972-77 (2010);
192. Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005);
193. Ellen Podgor, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, Foreword, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541, 557-80 (2005);
194. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506 (2001);
195. Ekow N. Yankah, A Paradox in Overcriminalization, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing Husak's theories in relation to the decriminalization of marijuana).
196. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2906 (2010) (narrowing interpretation of mail fraud statute's "honest services" provision);
197. Lisa Kern Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N. C. L. REV. 1815, 1824-26 (2011) (describing limitations imposed by Skilling as a response to overcriminalization).
198. Of course the rules of evidence are not solely about accuracy or even fairness. See David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of the Rule Against Trial By Character, 73 IND. L. J. 1161, 1186-87 (1998) (describing numerous "purposes" of the rules of evidence including promoting efficiency, or avoiding jury confusion or witness embarrassment).
199. Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L. J. 185, 200 (1983).
200. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (2006) (arguing that people obey the law because of its legitimacy, not out of fear).
201. See generally Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211 (2012) (discussing the substance-procedure divide in terms of perceptions of moral legitimacy and procedural fairness).
202. Cf. Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1271-72 (1998) ("Starkly absent from the academic discussion to date is a theory of process.").
203. See also Herring v. United States, 555 U. S. 135, 145-48 (2009);
204. Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 814-19 (1996);
205. United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 915-26 (1984).
206. But see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J, dissenting) ("[I]t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer had been competent.").
207. This reality is in tension with the principle that probable cause should be based on articulable facts distinct from a police officer's mere belief that a crime has been committed. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968) (reasonable suspicion must be based on facts and not police "hunches");
208. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S. 41, 47 (1933) (holding that officer's "mere affirmance of belief or suspicion" does not constitute probable cause).
209. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004) ("While procedural justice is concerned with the benefits of accuracy and the costs of adjudication, it is not solely concerned with those costs and benefits. Rather, procedural justice is deeply entwined with the old and powerful idea that a process that guarantees rights of meaningful participation is an essential prerequisite for the legitimate authority of action-guiding legal norms.").
210. Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1395-97 (2002) (arguing that underenforced, often violated, nonstigmatizing offenses such as speeding and other minor offenses can undermine public faith in the law);
211. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 465 (1996) (recognizing that prosecutorial decisionmaking is a highly discretionary process that is "not readily susceptible to the kinds of analysis the courts are competent to undertake");
212. Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 814-19 (1996) (holding that police officer's subjective motivations would not invalidate arrest under the Fourth Amendment if there was probable cause);
213. Armstrong, 517 U. S. at 464 (prosecutorial decisionmaking entitled to "presumption of regularity" that bars discovery of that process absent clear evidence to the contrary);
214. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 306-19 (1987) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were not violated by statistical evidence showing correlation between race and death-penalty decisions).
215. See, e.g., DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 135-41 (2008);
216. I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 1 (2011) (surveying profiling literature).
217. E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that mass incarceration has replaced Jim Crow and legal racial segregation in the modern era).
218. George P. Fletcher, The Meaning of Innocence, 48 U. TORONTO L. J. 157, 161 (1998).
219. See L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2037-38 (2011) (documenting that "hit rates", that is, rates at which contraband is found when a person is searched, are much higher for white suspects than black suspects).
220. Peter Arenella, Foreword: O. J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1234 (1996) (discussing the public perception that wealth determines case outcomes).
221. Hadar Aviram & Daniel Portman, Inequitable Enforcement: Introducing the Concept of Equity into Constitutional Review of Law Enforcement, 61 HASTINGS L. J. 413, 413 (2009) (discussing perceptions of unfairness that flow from discretionary enforcement).
222. See Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1029 (2004) (making a similar point about three-strikes law).
223. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80, 120-21 (1994) ("[Utilitarianism] presumes that human actors behave rationally; they will avoid engaging in crime if they believe that the potential pain of punishment is greater than the potential pleasure reaped from the crime.").
224. See, e.g., LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 6 (2009) (arguing that the criminal law works in tandem with the eroding social safety net to criminalize the poor);
225. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 6 (2007) (conceptualizing the idea of crime as a justification for various forms of governance).
226. See, e.g., CATHERINE KIM, DANIEL LOSEN & DAMON HEWITT, THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON-PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM (2010);
227. Rod K. Brunson & Jody Miller, Young Black Men and Urban Policing in the United States, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 613 (2006);
228. Devon Carbado, (E) racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002). My thanks to Mario Barnes for this point.
229. See generally Ian F. Haney López, Is the "Post" in Post-Racial the "Blind" in Colorblind?, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 807 (2011) (describing the pervasive racialization of crime); Capers, supra note 247 (same).
230. Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 224 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the decision to shift to the defense the burden of proof of proving extreme emotional distress represented a retreat from the presumption of innocence).
231. This procedural neglect is akin to what Richard Delgado years ago labeled "procedural racism", the ways that legal procedures make it difficult to express or raise claims of racism. See Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 105-07 (1990).
232. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 42 (1999).
233. PETER REUTER, ROBERT MACCOUN & PATRICK MURPHY, THE RAND CORP., MONEY FROM CRIME: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG DEALING IN WASHINGTON, D. C. 28, 37-38 (1990).
234. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 201-11 (1977) (explaining burdens of proof and persuasion).
235. Laurence A. Benner, The Presumption of Guilt: Systemic Factors that Contribute to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 267 (2009).
236. NOT GUILTY: TWELVE BLACK MEN SPEAK OUT ON LAW, JUSTICE, AND LIFE (Jabari Asim ed., 2001).
237. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (requiring a strong factual basis for recognizing guilty plea where defendant refused to concede guilt);
238. William Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2034-35 (2008) (recommending stronger scrutiny of factual basis for pleas and noting that military courts already do this).
239. E.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U. S. 374, 374-76 (2005).
240. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTION OF PROSECUTOR Standard 3-3. 1 (1993) ("Investigative Function of Prosecutor"), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/ criminal-justice-section-archive/crimjust-standards-pfunc-blk.html#3.1.
241. See also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 794 (1977) (assuming that prosecutors scrutinize police probable cause determinations in deciding whether to file charges).
242. Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself: Discretion and the Problem of Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads, A Response to Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143 (2011);
243. Adam Gershowitz & Laura Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 266-92 (2011).
244. AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, RECOMMENDATION 102C (2010) (recommending the use of civil fines or nonmonetary civil remedies instead of criminal sanctions for misdemeanors where appropriate), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal-justice-section- newsletter/crimjust-policy-midyear2010-102c.authcheckdam.pdf.
245. Sasha Abramsky, Is This the End of the War on Crime?, THE NATION, June 5, 2010, available at http://www.thenation. com/article/end-war-crime# (documenting recent trends away from traditional prison sentence towards other rehabilitation and criminal models);
246. Garrick L. Percival, "Smart on Crime": How a Shift in Political Attention Is Changing Penal Policy in America (Am. Political Sci. Ass'n, Annual Meeting Paper, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract-id=1901238 (noting policy trends toward "softer" criminal penalties and describing the "smart on crime" approach in America).