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Volumn 30, Issue , 2013, Pages 35-42

Cost overrun and auction format in small size public works

Author keywords

Average bid; Cost overrun; First price; Open entry

Indexed keywords


EID: 84873719825     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.01.002     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (27)

References (17)
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  • 6
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  • 8
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    • How common and how large are cost overruns in transport infrastructure projects?
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  • 12
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    • Competition and cost overruns in procurement
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  • 17
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    • High bids and broke winners
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.