Binding promises and cooperation among strangers

Economics Letters

Volumn 118, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 459-461

  Camera, Gabriele ^a,b   Casari, Marco ^c   Bigoni, Maria ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BASEL   (Switzerland)

^b CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Coordination; Deception; Repeated game; Social norms

Indexed keywords

EID: 84872708887     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.009     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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