Confronting supreme court fact finding

Virginia Law Review

Volumn 98, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 1255-1312

  Larsen, Allison Orr ^a  

^a Dept of Economics and Thomas Jefferson Program in Public Policy at the College of William and Mary   (United States)

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EID: 84871904513     PISSN: 00426601     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (243)

1. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 165-66 (2007).
2. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 (2008).
3. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 733 (2007);
4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U. S. 483, 493-94 (1954).
5. I disclaim any attempt to define with precision the line between law and fact. To be sure, there are those who say it is impossible to do. John McGinnis & Charles Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 Const. Comment. 69, 71 (2008) ("There is no analytic dichotomy between law and fact."). That difficult inquiry, however, lies outside the scope of this Article. I do note that even if the law-fact division line is fuzzy, it is still a line we expect courts to draw and one with which we often wrestle.
6. See, e.g., John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 489-93 (1986) (identifying the division between law and fact and discussing the similarities each has with social science research).
7. "Legislative fact" and "adjudicative fact" are phrases coined by Kenneth Culp Davis in 1942 to distinguish types of fact finding in administrative agencies. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Procedures, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 365-66 (1942).
8. More recently, scholars have refined and further categorized legislative facts-perhaps most notably David Faigman, who has classified what he calls "constitutional facts" into several categories depending on the purpose for which the fact is used. See David Faigman, Constitutional Fictions: A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, at xiii (2008);
9. see also John McGinnis & Charles Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 Const. Comment. 69, 70 (2008) (discussing confusion surrounding what they call "social facts");
10. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 145, 146 (2011) (discussing a form of legislative facts she calls "foundational facts" because they consist of the factual assumptions on which legal doctrine is based). All still pay homage, however, to Davis's original articulation of the distinction, and it is therefore his terminology on which I will primarily rely.
11. See Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 75, 77 n. 9 (explaining that "the phrase virtually belongs to Professor Kenneth C. Davis"
12. (citing Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 15.03 (1958))).
13. Brenda C. See, Written in Stone? The Record on Appeal and the Decision-Making Process, 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 157, 191 (2004) (stating that legislative facts are relevant when "the court is in essence 'making law' either by filling a gap in the common law by formulating a rule, construing a statute, or framing a constitutional rule").
14. David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 552 (1991).
15. Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1988);
16. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 159 (2007) ("While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.").
17. See Stuart M. Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 269, 273 (2000) ("Judicial opinions are filled with assertions about the state of the world⋯.");
18. Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 Duke L. J. 1, 52 (2011) ("[L]egislative facts often are-and have been-critical to court decisions.").
19. Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: "The Illusion of Certainty", 46 Hastings L. J. 1723, 1758 (1995);
20. see also Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L. J. 447, 449 (2009) (noting the "entrenched norm⋯ of party presentation");
21. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28 Rev. Litig. 131, 185 (2008).
22. Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 267, 285 (2001).
23. Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N. C. L. Rev. 115, 118 (2003) (describing and critiquing the increased use of empirical methods and data to decide constitutional cases);
24. see also A. Christopher Bryant, The Empirical Judiciary, 25 Const. Comment. 467, 468 (2008);
25. Gorod, supra note 10, at 28-33 (discussing the role of legislative facts in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)
26. and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 159 (2007)).
27. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1986) ("[Courts] always have the needed adjudicative facts, that is, the facts about the immediate parties-who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent. But courts often have inadequate legislative facts, that is, the facts that bear on the court's choices about law and policy.").
28. Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 Duke L. J. 1263, 1290 (2007) ("Judicial notice of legislative facts⋯ is basically unregulated.").
29. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 10.5 (2002) ("The judicial practice of using extra record facts for deciding questions of law and policy is deeply established. It has been accepted by the legal profession without challenge.");
30. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (c), (e);
31. see also Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 Duke L. J. 1169, 1179-81 (2000) (discussing the well-noted weaknesses of the judiciary as to fact finding, although challenging the assumption that Congress will be superior in all instances); (Pubitemid 33651481)
32. Phillip B. Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 19, 38 (1969) ("[T]he Court⋯ lacks machinery for gathering the wide range of facts and opinions that should inform the judgment of a prime policymaker.").
33. The Justices themselves seem well aware of the weakness. In Furman v. Georgia, for example, Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion specifically asserted that the "case against capital punishment⋯ rests primarily on factual claims, the truth of which cannot be tested by conventional judicial processes." 408 U. S. 238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34. Justice Souter provides a more recent example of this judicial candor. In his concurrence in Washington v. Glucksberg, Souter doubted the Court's ability to evaluate the factual claim that euthanasia would lead to coerced suicide. 521 U. S. 702, 786-87 (1997).
35. Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun 82-83, 90-91 (2005).
36. Linda Greenhouse, The Breyer Project: "Why Couldn't You Work This Thing Out?", 4 Charleston L. Rev. 37, 37 (2010) ("Breyer is the quintessential Enlightenment Supreme Court Justice. He believes in evidence and in expertise and in the power of both facts and experts to persuade.");
37. Linda Greenhouse, A Supreme Court Scorecard, N. Y. Times, July 13, 2011, 9:30 PM, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/a-supreme-court- scorecard/.
38. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U. S. 47 (2007) (Nos. 06-84, 06-100) (Breyer, J., questioning) ("So I looked up on the Internet approximately what percent of the people have the best credit score and that's about 1 percent.").
39. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011).
40. Only a handful of scholars have recognized this new reality. See Richard B. Cappalli, Bringing Internet Information to Court: Of "Legislative Facts", 75 Temp. L. Rev. 99, 103 (2002);
41. Judge Cathy Cochran, Surfing the Web for a Brandeis Brief, 70 Tex. B. J. 780 (2007);
42. Lee F. Peoples, The Citation of Wikipedia in Judicial Opinions, 12 Yale J. L. & Tech. 1 (2009). Most recently and most on point, Brianne Gorod has asked some very important questions about how appellate courts treat legislative facts generally. See Gorod, supra note 10.
43. As will be described infra, two indexes were used to generate the most salient (or more visible) Supreme Court decisions from each term. The first one (from Professors Epstein and Segal) measures salience by whether the opinion made the front page of The New York Times. The second one, the CQ guide, uses a more subjective measurement from journalists and commentators. Both indexes are popular among political scientists.
44. See, e.g., Theodore S. Arrington & Saul Brenner, Strategic Voting for Damage Control on the Supreme Court, 57 Pol. Res. Q. 565, 571-72 (2004);
45. Saul Brenner & Theodore S. Arrington, Measuring Salience on the Supreme Court: A Research Note, 43 Jurimetrics J. 99 (2002);
46. Todd A. Collins & Christopher A. Cooper, Case Salience and Media Coverage of Supreme Court Decisions: Toward a New Measure, 65 Pol. Res. Q. 396, 398-401 (2012);
47. Paul M. Collins, Jr., The Consistency of Judicial Choice, 70 J. Pol. 861, 863 (2008);
48. Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Constraints on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1729, 1750 n. 85 (2006).
49. As will be described below, minimalists believe in "judicial modesty"-that each case should be decided narrowly, shallowly, and one at a time-while maximalists think the rule of law is improved when judges are free to issue broad, fully theorized decisions designed to provide guidance. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (1999).
50. Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J. Legal Stud. 495, 498 (2000).
51. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 145, 150.
52. see also Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 Va. L. Rev. 559, 561 (1987) ("Though the legislative-adjudicative distinction was developed in the context of administrative law, a broader application ensued and today the usefulness of the distinction is widely recognized.").
53. I do not suggest that adjudicative facts are always clear-cut, nor are they always left to a jury or trial judge to decide. Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 378-86(2007), perhaps provides the best modern example of Supreme Court Justices evaluating trial evidence.
54. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 837, 838 (2009).
55. For an intriguing take on how our preexisting bias can influence our perception of facts, see Dan M. Kahan et al., "They Saw a Protest": Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn. com/abstract=1755706.
56. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Text § 7.03 (3d ed. 1972);
57. David L. Faigman, Defining Empirical Frames of Reference in Constitutional Cases: Unraveling the As-Applied Versus Facial Distinction in Constitutional Law, 36 Hastings Const. L. Q. 631, 635 (2009);
58. But see Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 111, 114 (1988) ("The key difference between adjudicative and legislative facts is not the characteristics of particular versus general facts, but rather, evidence whose proof has a more established place and more predictable effect within a framework of established legal rules as distinct from evidence that is more manifestly designed to create the rules.").
59. Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in Appellate Briefs, 34 U. S. F. L. Rev. 197, 198 (2000).
60. Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 945, 959 (1955) ("The judicial practice of going beyond the record for legislative facts is most pronounced in constitutional cases, but is not limited to those cases.").
61. 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011).
62. Fed. R. Evid. 201 (a) advisory committee's note
63. (citing Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 270-71 (1944));
64. see also Fed. R. Evid. 201 (a) advisory committee's note (quoted supra note 57).
65. See A Woman's Choice v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that legislative facts should be reviewed "without deference in order to prevent the idiosyncrasies of a single judge or jury from having far-reaching legal effects"); Gorod, supra note 10, at 45;
66. Andrew Koppleman, Power in the Facts, N. Y. Times, Aug. 4, 2010, 10:03 PM, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/08/04/gaymarriage-and-the- constitution/judge-walkers-factual-findings (discussing what is to happen to Judge Walker's factual findings in the California gay marriage case).
67. Fed. R. Evid. 201 (a) & accompanying advisory committee's note; Thornburg, supra note 11, at 153 ("The Federal Rules of Evidence and their state counterparts limit only judicial notice of adjudicative facts. Further, the Advisory Committee Notes encourage unfettered use of legislative facts, arguing that judicial access to legislative facts should not be restricted to any limitation in the form of indisputability or formal notice.").
68. Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 857, 899-900 (1992) ("The Rules' failure to address legislative facts has been criticized as too narrow and unambitious. This lack of guidance has led to concerns surrounding the process for noticing legislative facts.").
69. See Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U. S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 489, 535 (noting that an increased use of law clerks corresponds with an increased use of citations to precedent).
70. Tracy L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Procedure-and Three Answers, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 851, 855 ("Whether or not judges currently are able to handle social science research with expert ease, judges increasingly have suggested in opinions that they would like to see empirical work that is relevant to the issues presented to them⋯.");
71. Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1931, 1935-36 (2008).
72. see also Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1454, 1482 (2000) (explaining that explicitly giving reasons for decisions relates to the judicial craft "the way the Hippocratic Oath is a norm associated with medical craft; it is essential to the enterprise").
73. Faigman, supra note 7, at 545 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat) 1, 190 (1824)).
74. Thomas B. Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers 192 (1978).
75. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
76. Neal Devins & Alan Meese, Judicial Review and Nongeneralizable Cases, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 323, 325-26 (2005) (noting that Justices "announce rules that apply beyond the actual litigants and cases before them" and commenting on the Court's willingness to craft these rules in cases that involve plaintiffs with nongeneralizable claims).
77. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743, 752 (2000);
78. Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J. L. & Pol. 33, 34 (2004).
79. Richard L. Vining, Jr. & Teena Wilhelm, Measuring Case Salience in State Courts of Last Resort, 64 Pol. Res. Q. 559, 560-61 (2011)
80. (detailing publications which have used the Epstein-Segal New York Times salience measure for Supreme Court decisions).
81. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010).
82. 549 U. S. 497, 507 (2007).
83. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3138 (2010)
84. (citing Catherine A. Okoro et al., Prevalence of Household Firearms and Firearm-Storage Practices in the 50 States and the District of Columbia: Findings From the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2002, 116 Pediatrics 370, 372 (2005)).
85. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2653 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Ken Schroeder, Get Teens Off Drugs, Educ. Dig., Dec. 2006, at 75).
86. 131 S. Ct. at 2290 n. 3 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
87. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1413 (2011) (Sotomayor J., dissenting)
88. (citing N. King, F. Cheesman & B. Ostrom, Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U. S. District Courts 35-36 (2007)).
89. 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1589 (2010).
90. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789, 2791-93, 2795-98, 2802, 2807, 2812, 2817 (2008) (making twenty assertions of historical fact, supported by some sources coming from the briefs but more than thirty sources from outside the briefs).
91. 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008)
92. (citing Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, National Incident-Based Reporting System, 2005, Study No. 4720, available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu).
93. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2024, 2029, 2033 (2010) (relying on nine sources drawn from outside the briefs to discuss the prevalence of life sentences for juveniles).
94. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037, 3041, 3044 n. 28, 3045 n. 29, 3047, 3049 (2010) (relying on twelve non-brief sources to recount the history surrounding the Second Amendment).
95. 550 U. S. 124, 173 n. 3, 183 n. 7, 184 nn. 8-9 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (relying on sixteen sources from outside the briefs which discuss how abortion procedures affect women).
96. 129 S. Ct 2633, 2650-57 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on eighteen sources found in house to establish the "alarming national crisis" of prescription drug abuse by teenagers).
97. 130 S. Ct. 876, 925-27 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (making eight assertions about speech at the Founding, supported by nine non-brief sources).
98. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3166, 3168, 3170, 3178, 3180-81, 3212 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (making eleven assertions of fact including a long appendix on the structure of federal agencies and relying on eighteen different sources not in any briefs);
99. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 869-77 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing original research in an appendix to show how many states have adopted inter-district racial integration in school districting).
100. Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 869-77;
101. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2272 (2011).
102. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U. S. 184, 199 (2002) (citing medical journals outside the record on a case about whether carpel tunnel is a debilitating condition under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
103. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525, 587 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing medical risks of obesity to point out that tobacco is not unique in the risks it poses to the health of children).
104. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U. S. 715, 774-75 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
105. (citing two articles from The New York Times and one from the Los Angeles Times on the effect of silt on waterways in a case interpreting the Clean Water Act).
106. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S. 497, 507 (2007) (citing the website of the Department of Commerce).
107. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 173 n. 3 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
108. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584, 614-15 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
109. Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2517 (2010) (citing Nat'l Prison Rape Elimination Comm'n, National Prison Rape Elimination Report 4 (June 2009)).
110. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. 231, 268 (2005)
111. (citing various studies to show that discriminatory use of preemptory challenges is still a problem in spite of the decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986)).
112. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877, 903 (2007)
113. (citing R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (n. s.) 386 (1937)).
114. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1535 (2008) (citing the practice of giving muscle relaxers before euthanasia in the Netherlands in a case about the constitutionality of lethal injection);
115. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U. S. 844, 882 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing independently found sources for the proposition that "Americans attend their places of worship more often than do citizens of other developed nations⋯ and describe religion as playing an especially important role in their lives" (citations omitted)).
116. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U. S. 913, 964 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Wired News and CNET News).
117. See, e.g., Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2279 (2011) (Thomas J., concurring) ("Many thousands of police chases occur every year. In California and Pennsylvania, which collect statewide pursuit data, police were involved in a combined total of more than 8, 700 chases in 2007 alone.");
118. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3184 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (attaching an appendix with statistics gathered by the Office of Personnel Management and submitted to the Supreme Court library to demonstrate the number of administrative law judges subject to for-cause removal);
119. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1589 (2010) (citing statistics in Mediaweek magazine, outside the record, to demonstrate how large the national market is for hunting magazines).
120. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3065 & n. 4 (2010) (Thomas J., concurring) (citing historical sources-some discovered in house-to describe the Founding generation's use of the words "privileges and immunities");
121. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2795 n. 10 (2008) (collecting historical sources-some discovered in house-that use "bear arms" in non-military settings).
122. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 870 (2007) (Breyer J., dissenting) (attaching an appendix cataloging sources).
123. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U. S. 844, 878-80 (2005) (citing James Madison and Justice Story, although noting there are conflicting conclusions);
124. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 30 (2004) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing various examples of patriotic invocations of God in the early Republic).
125. Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N. Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 (quoting comments of Hon. Robert D. Sack at the Second Circuit Roundtable Discussion on March 8, 2007).
126. 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2653-54 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. 543 U. S. 220, 290 n. 11 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
128. 538 U. S. 11, 14 (2003).
129. Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U. S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 489, 490.
130. See, e.g., Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2517 (2010)
131. 545 U. S. 1, 19 (2005);
132. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
133. See, e.g., 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1535 (2008) (Roberts, C. J.) (plurality opinion) (citing Gerritt K. Kimsma, Euthanasia and Euthanizing Drugs in The Netherlands, in Drug Use in Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia 193, 200, 204 (Margaret P. Battin & Arthur G. Lipman eds., 1996), an article on euthanasia practices in the Netherlands); id. at 1539-40 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing ethics codes from nurses and emergency personnel); id. at 1543 n. 1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Rebecca H. Rhoades, The Humane Society of the United States Euthanasia Training Manual 133 (2002)); id. at 1558-61 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing historical examples of cruel execution methods).
134. (citing Perspective Roundtable: Physicians and Execution-Highlights from a Discussion of Lethal Injection, 358 New Eng. J. Med. 448 (2008)).
135. Id. at 1564 (Breyer J., concurring) (citing and critiquing the Lancet Study, Leonidas G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anaesthesia in Lethal Injection for Execution, 365 The Lancet 1412 (2005));
136. see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 7-8, Baze, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (No. 07-5439) (Breyer, J.) ("What are they? That is, I was-I can't find-what should I read? Because I've read the studies. I've read that Lancet study, which seemed to me the only referee for it said it wasn't any good. And I've read the Zimmer study and I found in there an amazing sentence to me which says that The Netherlands Information Task Force concluded it is not possible to administer so much of it that a lethal effect is guaranteed. They're talking about thiopental. So I'm left at sea. I understand your contention. You claim that this is somehow more painful than some other method. But which? And what's the evidence for that? What do I read to find it?").
137. 128 S. Ct. at 1541-42 (Alito, J., concurring). Other in-house factual authorities applying Eighth Amendment doctrine can be found in the cases discussing whether a "national consensus" has developed to stop imposing a particular punishment on a group of people.
138. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (supplementing the party's data as discussed above);
139. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008) (relying on a website found in house to demonstrate how many executions would be permitted if they could be imposed for convictions of child rape).
140. 532 U. S. 661, 683-84 (2001).
141. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 906 (2010) (citing B. Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 5 (1967)) (noting the Framers' understanding of robust free speech);
142. Heller, 554 U. S. at 583 & n. 7 (citing 3 A Compleat Collection of State-Tryals 185 (London, Timothy Goodwin 1719)) (showing common usage of the phrase "keep arms" in the early eighteenth century);
143. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U. S. 57, 96 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing 1 D. Kramer, Legal Rights of Children 124, 136 (2d. ed. 1994)) (asserting that through the nineteenth century there was no legal right of parental visitation).
144. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1991 (2010) (citing statistics in several law review articles for the assertion that joint legal custody has become "increasingly common");
145. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1553 (Scalia, J., concurring)
146. (citing Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 706 (2005)) (arguing that capital punishment has a deterrent effect).
147. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2270 n. 3 (2010) (citing D. Zulawski & D. Wicklander, Practical Aspects of Interview and Interrogation 55 (2d ed. 2002)) (stating that modern police training resources instruct officers to obtain a waiver or rights before interrogation);
148. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U. S. 586, 599 (2006) (citing D. Waksman & D. Goodman, The Search and Seizure Handbook (2d ed. 2006)) (showing an example of sources available to teach officers what is required of them under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment).
149. Parents Involved, 551 U. S. at 840
150. (citing Lincoln Quillian & Mary E. Campbell, Beyond Black and White: The Present and Future of Multiracial Friendship Segregation, 68 Am. Soc. Rev. 540, 541 (2003)).
151. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 364 (2003) (Thomas, J.) (citing study for the proposition that "black students experience superior cognitive development at historically black colleges").
152. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 892 (1992)
153. (citing James A. Mercy & Linda E. Saltzman, Fatal Violence Among Spouses in the United States, 1976-85, 79 Am. J. Pub. Health 595 (1989)).
154. Id. (citing Benigno E. Aguirre, Why Do They Return? Abused Wives in Shelters, 30 J. Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers 350, 352 (1985)).
155. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U. S. 184, 199 (2002)
156. (citing R. S. Carneiro, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome: The Cause Dictates the Treatment, 66 Cleveland Clinic J. Med. 159, 161-62 (1999)).
157. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2857 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
158. (citing Garen J. Wintemute, The Future of Firearm Violence Prevention, 282 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 475 (1999)).
159. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1541 (Alito, J., concurring)
160. (citing Perspective Roundtable: Physicians and Execution-Highlights from a Discussion on Lethal Injection, 358 New Eng. J. Med. 448 (2008)).
161. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 173 n. 3 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
162. (citing Eleanor A. Drey et al., Risk Factors Associated with Presenting for Abortion in the Second Trimester, 107 Obstetrics & Gynecology 128, 133 (2006)).
163. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 707 (2010)
164. (citing Jim Carlton, Gay Activists Boycott Backers of Prop 8, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 2008, at A3 (reporting that opponents of Proposition 8 compiled Internet blacklists of those supporting the law));
165. Locke v. Davey, 540 U. S. 712, 734 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
166. (citing Elaine Sciolino, Chirac Backs Law to Keep Signs of Faith Out of School, N. Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2003, at A17 (reporting on France banning religious attire-"invoking interests in secularism no less benign than those the Court embraces today")).
167. Ewing v. California, 538 U. S. 11, 26 (2003) (citing a newspaper-conducted study on recidivism rates in California).
168. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U. S. 125, 130 (1998) (citing to show common usage of the phrase "to carry").
169. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2290 n. 3 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing articles covering car crash to show dangers of high speed chases).
170. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1589 (2010) (citing an article in Mediaweek about hunting popularity);
171. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U. S. 913, 964-65 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing articles in Music Week and on wired.com about the piracy fight);
172. PGA Tour, 532 U. S. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Sporting News);
173. id. at 684 n. 40 (Stevens, J.) (citing Golf Magazine's Encyclopedia of Golf to show competitive nature about the game of golf).
174. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1230 & nn. 16-17 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
175. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831, 845 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
176. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2669 n. 2 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
177. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U. S. 586, 614 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, 625-26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 252 (2006).
180. See Abbot v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 18, 27 (2010);
181. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3181 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
182. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2024 (2010);
183. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U. S. 365, 374 & n. 10 (2006);
184. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U. S. 296, 324 n. 2 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
185. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 551 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
186. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U. S. 838, 863 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
187. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U. S. 504, 521 n. 8 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
188. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 209 (1987).
189. 130 S. Ct. at 2024.
190. 526 U. S. at 863 (citing Memorandum from Carol R. Flango, Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, to Supreme Court Library (June 11, 1999) (on file with Clerk of Court's case file)).
191. Thornburg, supra note 11, at 167-68 (discussing People v. Mar, 52 P.3d 95 (Cal. 2002), a California Supreme Court decision in which the majority candidly admitted to "us[ing] a Google search to learn about stun belts and their medical effects").
192. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). Whether or not these specific studies were sound is a debate I need not enter.
193. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Sociologists, Psychologists, and Law and Economics Scholars in Support of Respondents at 14-15, Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219)
194. 2008 WL 275482 at *14-15;
195. Brief of Plaintiffs, In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1997)
196. (Nos. 97-35191, 97-35192, 97-35193), 1997 WL 34647140 at *39 n. 44.
197. 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011).
198. Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You 8-17 (2011) [hereinafter Pariser, The Filter Bubble];
199. see also Eli Pariser, When the Internet Thinks It Knows You, N. Y. Times, May 22, 2011, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/opinion/ 23pariser.html.
200. See Jacob Weisberg, Bubble Trouble: Is Web Personalization Turning Us into Solipsistic Twits?, Slate.com, June 10, 2011, 7:16 AM, http://www.slate. com/articles/news-and-politics/the-big-idea/2011/06/bubble-trouble.html. In any event, all seem to concur that the technology to produce the filter bubble is out there; therefore biased results from tailored Internet searches present at least a potential risk of in-house fact finding.
201. Frost, supra note 11, at 500 (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U. S. 1, 13 (1979));
202. see also Neonatology Assocs. v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2002) (opinion of then-Judge Alito) ("[T]he fundamental assumption of our adversary system [is] that strong (but fair) advocacy on behalf of opposing views promotes sound decision making.");
203. Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 717, 718-19 (2010) (noting that "[t]he rationale underlying [the adversary system] is that competition between opposing parties leads to the triumph of truth", but arguing that this model assumes "fairly matched adversaries").
204. But see Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 Yale L. J. 1535, 1616-25 (1998) (criticizing use of competing expert testimony to elucidate scientific facts).
205. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
206. Debra Cassens Weiss, SG: Bureau of Prisons Supplied Wrong Info to SCOTUS in Landmark Juvenile Case, ABA J., May 28, 2010, 8:48 AM, http://www.abajournal. com/news/article/sg-says-bureau-of-prisons-supplied-wrong-information-to- supreme-court.
207. See Tony Mauro, Solicitor General Revises Data on Federal Juvenile Sentences, Blog of Legal Times, May 24, 2010, 7:50 PM, http://legaltimes. typepad.com/blt/2010/05/solicitor-general-revises-data-on-federal-juvenile- sentences.html (quoting a May 24, 2010 letter from Acting Solicitor General to Clerk of the Supreme Court).
208. Frost, supra note 11, at 500 (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U. S. 1, 13 (1979)) ("[O]ur legal tradition regards the adversary process as the best means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the risk of error.").
209. Yvette Ostolaza & Ricardo Pellafone, Applying Model Rule 4.2 to Web 2.0: The Problem of Social Networking Sites, 11 J. High Tech. L. 56, 76 (2010) ("An individual can post content on the web for free, making it instantly accessible to anyone who wishes to view it; there are no barriers to enter the world of online publishing apart from accessing the Internet.").
210. Thomas Goetz, Reinventing Television: We Interrupt This Broadcast to Bring You a Special Report from Jon Stewart, Wired, Sept. 2005, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.09/stewart.html.
211. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U. S. 579 (1993).
212. See Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J. L. & Pol'y 19, 30 (2007-2008) (noting the relative inexperience judges have in math and science). To be sure, it is possible that a Justice has a prior background in medicine, physics, or psychology, but at the very least her time on the bench would make her out of practice and perhaps out of touch with the latest research trends.
213. Brewer, supra note 191, at 1538 ("Most judges and juries, however, are not sufficiently familiar with relevant scientific fields to be able independently and reliably to bring scientific information to bear on their decisions."); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 Emory L. J. 1005, 1081 (1989) ("The legal relevance of social science research simply cannot be divorced from its scientific credibility.");
214. Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. Tort L. 1, 32 (2011) ("Courts are severely limited in their ability to collect and process large quantities of information about social problems, or to evaluate that information when it implicates disputed issues of science or economics.");
215. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N. C. L. Rev. 91, 94-95 (1993).
216. But see Cheng, supra note 18, at 1274 (arguing for greater independent research on scientific data, and noting that "[a] judge can just as easily search the New England Journal of Medicine or some other science-related site as Westlaw or LEXIS"). In addition, some scholars have called for the judiciary to obtain greater familiarity with empirical methods so they are more equipped to handle claims with empirical basis.
217. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
218. Id. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting René Weber, Ute Ritterfeld & Klaus Mathiak, Does Playing Violent Video Games Induce Aggression? Empirical Evidence of a Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study, 8 Media Psychol. 39, 51 (2006)).
219. This study was not the product of in-house research; it was cited in a brief submitted by scientists as amici curiae. See Brief of Social Scientists, Medical Scientists, and Media Effects Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 29, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448). Nonetheless, it still illustrates the larger point that evaluation of science is difficult for judges, making it all the more significant when they do so on their own.
220. See Neuroskeptic, Violent Brains In The Supreme Court, Neuroskeptic Blogspot, July 15, 2011, 9:00 AM, http://neuroskeptic.blogspot.com/2011/07/ violent-brains-insupreme-court.html.
221. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 & n. 9 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
222. (citing Dave Barth, The Bright Side of Sitting in Traffic: Crowdsourcing Road Congestion Data, Google Official Blog, Aug. 25, 2009, 11:16 AM, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/08/bright-side-of-sitting-in-traffic.html).
223. PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U. S. 661, 684 n. 40 (2001) (Stevens, J.) (citing Golf Magazine to show changes in the game of golf); id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Sporting News to show the competitive nature of the game of golf).
224. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, 625-26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("And let us not forget the Court's abortion jurisprudence, which makes us one of only six countries that allow abortion on demand until the point of viability.")
225. (citing Center for Reproductive Rights, The World's Abortion Laws (June 2004), http://www.reproductiverights.org/pub-fac-abortion. html).
226. Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 615, 619-24 (2000).
227. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729.
228. An example of ambushing an attorney with extra-record facts can be seen at oral argument in last term's Milner v. Department of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011). The Court was interpreting a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") provision that exempted the government from making certain disclosures. The question at hand was whether the Navy had to disclose some maps it thought should be kept secret for security purposes. At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts asked the lawyer for the Navy whether a government agency could just classify the information, regardless of whether the FOIA exemption applied. The attorney said that he was not "an original classifying authority", and so he "was not in a position to say." At that point, Justice Alito jumped in and supplied an example he found on the Internet: "There is a document on the FBI web site called 'Security clearance process for state and local law enforcement', which seems to address exactly [this] situation. "
229. *28-29, Milner, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (No. 09-1163), 2010 WL 4876494.
230. Stephan Landsman, Readings on Adversarial Justice: The American Approach to Adjudication 34 (1988).
231. The list of amici who weighed in on this question include: the National Association of Broadcasters, the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Rutherford Institute, Common Sense Media, Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, the California Psychological Association, the California Psychiatric Association, a collection of social scientists, medical scientists, and media effect scholars, and ten different states. Briefs of Amici Curiae, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-2448).
232. Id. at xi ("The current Supreme Court embraces minimalism."); Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 205, 207 ("[W]e have seen an increase in narrow and fact-specific rulings⋯.").
233. Jonathan H. Adler, Making Sense of the Supreme Court, The Volokh Conspiracy, July 2, 2010, 9:58 AM, http://volokh.com/2010/07/02/making-sense-of- thesupreme-court ("[A]t present, we can characterize the Roberts Court as a moderately conservative minimalist Court (except when its [sic] not).").
234. Sunstein, supra note 39, at 9; Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court Opinions and Justices, 60 Emory L. J. 407, 491 (2010);
235. Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken: Standing to Challenge Faith-Based Spending, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1009, 1046 (2011);
236. David D. Kirkpatrick, Judge's Mentor: Part Guide, Part Foil, N. Y. Times, June 22, 2009, at A1, A11 (portraying then-Judge Sotomayor as a judicial minimalist and quoting former Yale Law Dean and Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi, who described Sotomayor's approach in a controversial case as one of "judicial minimalism");
237. Dahlia Lithwick, Her Honor, New York Magazine, Nov. 27, 2011, http://nymag.com/news/politics/elenakagan-2011-12/index4.html (Justice Kagan "is deciding her cases one at a time, without hints or promises about where she may be moved down the road.").
238. Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1971, 1978 (1999) (noting that judicial minimalism is supported by inherent limitations on the fact-finding ability of courts because courts are "shackled by the temporal and reactive nature of litigation" and they simply do not have the resources to "engage in thorough cost-benefit analysis" of important factual questions).
239. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883 (2006).
240. Id. at 905; see also Devins & Meese, supra note 78; Frost, supra note 11, at 516 (arguing that in some circumstances it is necessary for judges to address issues not presented by the parties "when failure to do so would lead to inaccurate or misleading statements of law"); Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 933, 933 (2006).
241. Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1998).
242. At least one scholar has recently noticed that the Court is acting like an administrative agency with respect to facts relevant to antitrust violations. See Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1247 (2011). The implications of this analogy demand far more attention, and I hope to pursue them in later work.
243. American Bar Association, What Is "The Citizen Amicus Project"?, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal-justice/citizen- amicus/purpose.html (last visited May 16, 2012).