Physician response to financial incentives when choosing drugs to treat breast cancer

International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 285-302

  Epstein, Andrew J ^a,b,c   Johnson, Scott J ^d  

^a VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL CENTER   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^d PRECISION HEALTH ECONOMICS   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency; Financial incentives; Medicare; Physician treatment decisions; Reimbursement

Indexed keywords

ANTINEOPLASTIC AGENT; GENERIC DRUG;

ARTICLE; BREAST TUMOR; CANCER REGISTRY; CLINICAL PRACTICE; ECONOMICS; FEMALE; HUMAN; INSURANCE; MEDICARE; METASTASIS; MOTIVATION; PATHOLOGY; STATISTICS; UNITED STATES;

ANTINEOPLASTIC AGENTS; BREAST NEOPLASMS; DRUGS, GENERIC; FEMALE; HUMANS; INSURANCE CLAIM REVIEW; MEDICARE; MOTIVATION; NEOPLASM METASTASIS; PHYSICIAN'S PRACTICE PATTERNS; SEER PROGRAM; UNITED STATES;

EID: 84871177028     PISSN: 13896563     EISSN: 15736962     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10754-012-9117-y     Document Type: Article

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