Physician response to Medicare fee reductions: Changes in the volume of coronary artery bypass graft (CABG)surgeries in the Medicare and private sectors

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 6, 1998, Pages 675-699

  Yip, Winnie C ^a  

^a HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH   (United States)

Author keywords

Demand inducement; Income effects; Medicare; Physician behavior

Indexed keywords

CORONARY ARTERY BYPASS SURGERY; FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE NEED; MEDICAL FEE; MEDICARE; PHYSICIAN ATTITUDE; PHYSICIAN INCOME; PRIVATE PRACTICE; PROFIT; PROSPECTIVE PRICING; REIMBURSEMENT; REVIEW; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0031736479     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6296(98)00024-1     Document Type: Article

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