Narratives of 'terminal sedation', and the importance of the intention-foresight distinction in palliative care practice

Bioethics

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 1-11

  Douglas, Charles D ^a   Kerridge, Ian H ^b   Ankeny, Rachel A ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Double effect; End of life; Euthanasia; Hypnotics and sedatives; Intention; Qualitative research; Terminal care

Indexed keywords

HYPNOTIC SEDATIVE AGENT;

ADULT; AGED; ARTICLE; AUSTRALIA; BEHAVIOR; CLINICAL PRACTICE; ETHICS; EUTHANASIA; FEMALE; HUMAN; MALE; MEDICAL ETHICS; METHODOLOGY; MIDDLE AGED; PALLIATIVE THERAPY; QUALITATIVE RESEARCH; TERMINAL CARE; VERBAL COMMUNICATION;

ADULT; AGED; AUSTRALIA; DOUBLE EFFECT PRINCIPLE; EUTHANASIA; FEMALE; HUMANS; HYPNOTICS AND SEDATIVES; INTENTION; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; NARRATION; PALLIATIVE CARE; PHYSICIAN'S PRACTICE PATTERNS; QUALITATIVE RESEARCH; TERMINAL CARE;

EID: 84870733154     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: 14678519     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2011.01895.x     Document Type: Article

References (34)

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20. A form of breathing support apparatus.
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26. We think her argument is contrived. To invite confusion, one has to use the adjective (or adverb): If Dr. Smith intentionally (i.e. deliberately) gave the drugs, and the patients died as a result, in a 'broad' sense it is true to say that 'Dr. Smith 'intentionally' caused the patients to die', whether or not he actually aimed at their deaths. Jansen extrapolates from this fairly limited problem of terminology to imply, without further justification, that there are two completely different and accepted uses of the noun ('intention') and the verb ('intend') such that people 'might be unsure which sense of intention is the one we are asking about'. We think the noun and verb have fairly straightforward commonsense meanings, at least when linked to a specific outcome, eg 'Did you give drugs with the intention of hastening death?' Furthermore, one of the advantages of conducting in-depth interviews is that we can observe and clarify any potential misunderstandings. We observed no confusion along the lines suggested by Jansen, in this or our previous study.
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30. For a brief summary of the problems with hard cases and the idea of 'closeness', see pp. 339-340
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