Selection and Influence: Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on Trade Policy

International Organization

Volumn 57, Issue 3, 2003, Pages

  Fordham, Benjamin O ^a   McKeown, Timothy J ^b  

^a STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042380072     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0020818303573076     Document Type: Article

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