Why do criminals obey the law? The influence of legitimacy and social networks on active Gun offenders

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology

Volumn 102, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 397-440

  Papachristos, Andrew V ^a   Meares, Tracey L ^a   Fagan, Jeffrey ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Howard Hughes Medical Institute   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84870271289     PISSN: 00914169     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (106)

1. See generally Clifford R. Shaw & Henry D. McKay, Juvenile Delinquency in Urban Areas (1942).
2. Edwin H. Sutherland, Principles Of Criminology (4th ed. 1947)
3. Mark Warr, Companions In Crime (2002)
4. Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 Sci. 918 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
6. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
7. See Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 223, 224 (2007).
8. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
9. For a recent review, see Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 Ohio State J. Crim. L. 173, 175-85 (2008).
10. See, e.g., David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power 15-16 (1991) (defining legitimacy along three dimensions, including rules that are justified "by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate").
11. Comm. to Review Research on Police Policy & Practices, Nat'l Research Council, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence 297 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) (citation omitted).
12. David J. Smith, The Foundations of Legitimacy, in Legitimacy and Criminal Justice 30, 30 (Tom R. Tyler et al. eds., 2007).
13. Morris Zelditch Jr., Legitimacy Theory, in Contemporary Social Psychological Theories 324 (Peter J. Burke ed., 2006).
14. Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 119, 145-47 (2012).
15. See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 765, 820 (2010) (arguing that obstacles to reentry, imposed because of the conviction, "decreas[e] the utility of non-offending" and explain the low deterrence effect of even long-term incarceration).
16. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 Ohio State J. Crim. L. 231, 265 (2008).
17. See generally E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology Of Procedural Justice (1988) (discussing studies demonstrating that individuals' views of the system depend on justice of procedures as well as justice of outcome).
18. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
19. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
20. Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 84, 94 (2004).
21. See Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 Criminology 253, 276 (2004) (concluding such treatment led to a lower belief in the occurrence of racial profiling).
22. See Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 Criminology 253, 276 (2004) (concluding such treatment led to a lower belief in the occurrence of racial profiling).
23. See generally E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology Of Procedural Justice (1988) (discussing studies demonstrating that individuals' views of the system depend on justice of procedures as well as justice of outcome).
24. See generally E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology Of Procedural Justice (1988) (discussing studies demonstrating that individuals' views of the system depend on justice of procedures as well as justice of outcome).
25. See, e.g., David S. Kirk & Mauri Matsuda, Legal Cynicism, Collective Efficacy, and the Ecology of Arrest, 49 Criminology 443, 467 (2011) (concluding that crimes in neighborhoods with high levels of cynicism are less likely to lead to arrest).
26. See, e.g., David S. Kirk & Mauri Matsuda, Legal Cynicism, Collective Efficacy, and the Ecology of Arrest, 49 Criminology 443, 467 (2011) (concluding that crimes in neighborhoods with high levels of cynicism are less likely to lead to arrest).
27. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
28. For example, Braga et al. estimate that in 2006, 1% of Boston youth ages fifteen to twenty-four were involved in street gangs and that Boston gang members were involved as offenders or victims in 70% of fatal and non-fatal shootings. Anthony A. Braga, David Hureau & Christopher Winship, Losing Faith? Police, Black Churches, and the Resurgence of Youth Violence in Boston, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 141, 153-54 (2008).
29. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
30. Edwin H. Sutherland, Principles Of Criminology (4th ed. 1947)
31. Peter S. Bearman & James Moody, Suicide and Friendships Among American Adolescents, 94 Am. J. Pub. Health 89 (2004).
32. Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network over 32 Years, 357 New Eng. J. Med. 370 (2007).
33. See generally David Strang & Sarah A. Soule, Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills, 24 Ann. Rev. Soc. 265 (1998) (reviewing the literature and statistical models on network diffusion).
34. See generally John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, Robert H. Salisbury & Robert L. Nelson, Inner Circles of Hollow Core? Elite Networks in National Policy Systems, 52 J. Pol. 356 (1990) (describing network influence on political processes).
35. See, e.g., Jean Marie McGloin & Alex R. Piquero, On the Relationship Between Co-Offending Network Redundancy and Offending Versatility, 47 J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 63 (2010) (concluding that density of offending networks relates with network density).
36. See generally Andrew V. Papachristos, The Coming of a Networked Criminology? Using Social Network Analysis in the Study of Crime and Deviance, in 17 Advances in Criminological Theory 101 (John MacDonald ed., 2011) (reviewing network research in criminology).
37. Mark Warr, Companions In Crime (2002)
38. See, e.g., Mark Warr, Age, Peers, and Delinquency, 31 Criminology 17, 29-30 (1993) (demonstrating the relationship between number of delinquent friends and delinquency).
39. E.g., Patrick Bayer, Randi Hjalmarsson & David Pozen, Building Criminal Capital Behind Bars: Peer Effects in Juvenile Corrections, 124 Q.J. Econ. 105, 135 (2009) (showing strong evidence of peer influences among incarcerated juvenile offenders for burglary, petty larceny, drug offenses, aggravated assault, and felony sex offenses).
40. For recent reviews on the state of network analysis in criminological research, see Jean Marie McGloin & David S. Kirk, An Overview of Social Network Analysis, 21 J. Crim. Just. Educ. 169 (2010).
41. See, e.g., Mark Warr, Age, Peers, and Delinquency, 31 Criminology 17, 29-30 (1993) (demonstrating the relationship between number of delinquent friends and delinquency).
42. See generally Andrew V. Papachristos, The Coming of a Networked Criminology? Using Social Network Analysis in the Study of Crime and Deviance, in 17 Advances in Criminological Theory 101 (John MacDonald ed., 2011) (reviewing network research in criminology).
43. See Stanley Wasserman & Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis 101-03, 271-72 (1994).
44. See, e.g., James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 Am. J. Soc. S95, S112, S115 (1988) (demonstrating the role of network closure on the development of social capital).
45. See, e.g., Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 Am. J. Soc. 1287, 1292, 1302 (1987) (finding that the diffusion of technology is related to network structure).
46. See, e.g., Mark Warr, Age, Peers, and Delinquency, 31 Criminology 17, 29-30 (1993) (demonstrating the relationship between number of delinquent friends and delinquency).
47. See, e.g., Ronald S. Burt, Structural Holes (1992) (regarding the relationship between network structure, informational flows, and returns to network brokerage).
48. See, e.g., Mark Warr, Age, Peers, and Delinquency, 31 Criminology 17, 29-30 (1993) (demonstrating the relationship between number of delinquent friends and delinquency).
49. E.g., Scott H. Decker & G. David Curry, Addressing Key Features of Gang Membership, 28 J. Crim. Just. 477, 479-80 (2000) (discussing different positions within gang structures).
50. See, e.g., Mark Warr, Age, Peers, and Delinquency, 31 Criminology 17, 29-30 (1993) (demonstrating the relationship between number of delinquent friends and delinquency).
51. See, e.g., Marvin D. Krohn, The Web of Conformity: A Network Approach to the Explanation of Delinquent Behavior, 33 Soc. Probs. S83-S89 (1986).
52. Though "weak ties"-such as causal acquaintances, old classmates, and friends-of-friends-are important in other types of behaviors, such as getting a job, finding a romantic partner, and certain business relationships. See Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 Am. J. Soc. 1360 (1973).
53. See generally Andrew V. Papachristos, The Coming of a Networked Criminology? Using Social Network Analysis in the Study of Crime and Deviance, in 17 Advances in Criminological Theory 101 (John MacDonald ed., 2011) (reviewing network research in criminology).
54. See, e.g., Mark Warr, Age, Peers, and Delinquency, 31 Criminology 17, 29-30 (1993) (demonstrating the relationship between number of delinquent friends and delinquency).
55. See, e.g., Jean Marie McGloin & Alex R. Piquero, On the Relationship Between Co-Offending Network Redundancy and Offending Versatility, 47 J. Res. Crime & Delinq. 63 (2010) (concluding that density of offending networks relates with network density).
56. See, e.g., Mark Warr, Age, Peers, and Delinquency, 31 Criminology 17, 29-30 (1993) (demonstrating the relationship between number of delinquent friends and delinquency).
57. See generally Andrew V. Papachristos, The Coming of a Networked Criminology? Using Social Network Analysis in the Study of Crime and Deviance, in 17 Advances in Criminological Theory 101 (John MacDonald ed., 2011) (reviewing network research in criminology).
58. See generally Andrew V. Papachristos, The Coming of a Networked Criminology? Using Social Network Analysis in the Study of Crime and Deviance, in 17 Advances in Criminological Theory 101 (John MacDonald ed., 2011) (reviewing network research in criminology).
59. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
60. Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 Sci. 918 (1997).
61. James D. Wright & Peter Rossi, The Armed Criminal in America (1985).
62. Peter V. Marsden, Core Discussion Networks of Americans, 52 Am. Soc. Rev. 122 (1987).
63. James D. Wright & Peter Rossi, The Armed Criminal in America (1985).
64. The Illinois Department of Corrections Parole Program supervises persons released from prison prior to the completion of their sentences through individualized monitoring and direct supervision in the community. See IDOC Overview, Ill. Dep't Corr., http://www.idoc.state.il.us/subsections/dept_overview/dept_overview.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
65. We were financially constrained from gathering a larger, stratified sample.
66. See, e.g., Peter Reuter, Epilogue: Connecting Drug Policy and Research on Drug Markets, 11 Crime Prevention Stud. 319 (2000) (describing illegal drug markets).
67. See, e.g., Wim Bernasco & Richard Block, Where Offenders Choose to Attack: A Discrete Choice Model of Robberies in Chicago, 47 Criminology 93 (2009) (analyzing the spatial distribution of crime in Chicago).
68. Five interviews were conducted in respondents' homes due to mobility restrictions of respondents' release-i.e., curfew restrictions, electronic monitoring, etc.
69. The response rate reflects the tremendous amount of effort that went into actually locating respondents. Much of the initial information we received about our sample was out of date. Interviewers worked closely with probation and parole to obtain the most recent information. Our biggest challenge in our response rates was related to actually finding respondents. If one considered our response rate without actually locating respondents, the rate falls below 40%. Once we found respondents, however, the rate increased to 60%.
70. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
71. Stephen W. Raudenbush, Christopher Johnson & Robert J. Sampson, A Multivariate, Multilevel Rasch Model with Application to Self-Reported Criminal Behavior, 33 Soc. Methodology 169 (2003).
72. Stephen W. Raudenbush, Christopher Johnson & Robert J. Sampson, A Multivariate, Multilevel Rasch Model with Application to Self-Reported Criminal Behavior, 33 Soc. Methodology 169 (2003).
73. See Stanley Wasserman & Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis 101-03, 271-72 (1994).
74. The CAPI system did impose an upper limit of thirty names, but no respondent used all thirty names. Interviewers were prepared to capture additional names using a paper system should the respondent list more than thirty alters.
75. Peter V. Marsden, Core Discussion Networks of Americans, 52 Am. Soc. Rev. 122 (1987).
76. See, e.g., Mark Warr, Age, Peers, and Delinquency, 31 Criminology 17, 29-30 (1993) (demonstrating the relationship between number of delinquent friends and delinquency).
77. Peter V. Marsden, Core Discussion Networks of Americans, 52 Am. Soc. Rev. 122 (1987).
78. Peter V. Marsden, Core Discussion Networks of Americans, 52 Am. Soc. Rev. 122 (1987).
79. See, e.g., Marvin D. Krohn, The Web of Conformity: A Network Approach to the Explanation of Delinquent Behavior, 33 Soc. Probs. S83-S89 (1986).
80. Though "weak ties"-such as causal acquaintances, old classmates, and friends-of-friends-are important in other types of behaviors, such as getting a job, finding a romantic partner, and certain business relationships. See Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 Am. J. Soc. 1360 (1973).
81. This is due, in part, to the interaction of these variables with gang members, as discussed below.
82. See Michael J. Hindelang, Travis Hirschi & Joseph G. Weis, Correlates of Delinquency: The Illusion of Discrepancy Between Self-Report and Official Measures, 44 Am. Soc. Rev. 995 (1979).
83. Robert Brame et al., Criminal Careers of Serious Delinquents in Two Cities, 2 Youth Violence & Juv. Just. 256, 268-69 (2004).
84. Chicago's gun law referred to here was struck down by the Supreme Court. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
85. See Jan Kornelis Dijkstra, Siegwart Lindenberg, René Veenstra, Christian Steglich, Jenny Isaacs, Noel A. Card & Ernest V.E. Hodges, Influence and Selection Processes in Weapon Carrying During Adolescence: The Roles of Status, Aggression, and Vulnerability, 48 Criminology 187 (2010).
86. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/24-3.1(b) (2010) states that unlawful possession of a handgun is a Class 4 felony. Under 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/12-2(b) (2002), fighting can be either a misdemeanor or a felony assault, depending on whether a firearm is used in the crime. Thus, fighting encompasses a wide range of criminal acts and sentences ranging from a Class 4 felony to a Class A misdemeanor.
87. Other items in this scale yield roughly the same results.
88. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
89. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
90. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
91. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
92. See, e.g., Mary Pattillo-McCoy, Black Picket Fences (1999) (describing social networks in African-American middle class communities in Chicago).
93. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
94. See, e.g., David S. Kirk & Mauri Matsuda, Legal Cynicism, Collective Efficacy, and the Ecology of Arrest, 49 Criminology 443, 467 (2011) (concluding that crimes in neighborhoods with high levels of cynicism are less likely to lead to arrest).
95. Although not included in the survey itself, fieldwork conducted by one of the authors during the survey period suggests that offenders believe that prosecutors are generally "smarter" and "more professional" than police. As one forum participant explained to one of the authors: "The cops, man, they just like us. You know what I mean? They got a job, they out there, doing their thing... but, those lawyers, man, they had to go to school. They got a degree. Had to take tests... they don't have as much discretion. They got to follow the law too. Sure, they can bend it a bit, but they have rules they play by... cops, bend it a whole hell of a lot more." Verbal communication with author (Chicago, Mar. 11, 2006).
96. See, e.g., David S. Kirk & Mauri Matsuda, Legal Cynicism, Collective Efficacy, and the Ecology of Arrest, 49 Criminology 443, 467 (2011) (concluding that crimes in neighborhoods with high levels of cynicism are less likely to lead to arrest).
97. No discernible differences in network size or density were detected when interacted with gang membership and are therefore not included in the model.
98. Malcolm W. Klein & Cheryl L. Maxson, Street Gang Patterns and Policies 152-54 (2006).
99. The positive value of the parameter is most likely due to the fact that most of the probationers and parolees were employed as part of their release or sentence.
100. See, e.g., Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 Am. J. Soc. 1287, 1292, 1302 (1987) (finding that the diffusion of technology is related to network structure).
101. The gang members * less than 50% criminal alters are dropped from Models (2) and (3) because there was no variation in these cases. None of those individuals reported carrying a gun outside the home.
102. The gang member * > 50% criminal alters variable perfectly predicts failure-i.e., all of these individuals reported getting into a fight.
103. For a recent review, see Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 Ohio State J. Crim. L. 173, 175-85 (2008).
104. This is a standard critique of nearly all gang research emanating from Chicago. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Maxson & Malcolm W. Klein, "Playgroups" No Longer: Urban Street Gangs in the Los Angeles Region, in From Chicago to L.A. 235 (Michael J. Dear ed., 2002).
105. Malcolm W. Klein & Cheryl L. Maxson, Street Gang Patterns and Policies 152-54 (2006).
106. E.g., Mark S. Fleisher, Doing Field Research on Diverse Gangs: Interpreting Youth Gangs as Social Networks, in Gangs in America III, at 119, 202-10 (C. Ronald Huff ed., 2002) (demonstrating that the networks of gang girls extend to a great degree into non-gang networks).