How much do we really know about criminal deterrence?

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology

Volumn 100, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 765-824

  Paternoster, Raymond ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

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EID: 79251640122     PISSN: 00914169     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (339)

1. It is easy enough to see that criminal deterrence frequently and effectively influences our actions. We all throw out the anchor on the highway when we spot a patrol car. We generally do not park in handicapped-only parking spots. We do not light up a joint at the movies. Burglars like to break into unoccupied homes. Drug deals are typically made in the shadows and not out in the open where police can see. But while we know that deterrence works in the absence of doing nothing about crime, we are decidedly less certain about relative or marginal deterrent effects. For example, does increasing the number of police officers reduce crime? Does adding three years to a prison sentence for the use of a gun deter firearm-related felonies? Does an increased use of incarceration deter crime better compared with previous levels of incarceration?
2. Cesare Beccaria, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., Macmillan 1986) (1764).
3. Jeremy Bentham, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Prometheus Books 1988) (1789).
4. Id. at 10-13.
5. BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 4.
6. Id. at 3-4.
7. See id. at 17-20, 25-28.
8. Id. at 8-9.
9. Id. at 17-19.
10. Id. at 93-99.
11. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 12-13.
13. Id. at 62-64.
14. Id. at 58.
15. Id. at 58-59.
16. Id. at 46-47, 55-57, 62-64.
17. Id. at 93.
18. Id. at 93-99.
19. Id. at 98.
20. Id. at 99.
21. Jean Jacques Rousseau, EMILE: OR ON EDUCATION (Dartmouth Coll. Press 2010) (1762).
22. Jeremy Bentham, PANOPTICON (1787).
23. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 1.
24. Id. at 31.
25. Id. at 70.
26. See generally id. at 97-130.
27. See generally THE REASONING CRIMINAL: RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVES ON OFFENDING (Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke eds., 1986).
28. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 25.
29. See id. at 24-42.
30. Id. at 29-32.
31. Id. at 33-42.
32. Id. at 41.
33. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
34. Nicole Rafter, THE CRIMINAL BRAIN: UNDERSTANDING BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF CRIME 19-21 (2008).
35. Id. at 65-70.
36. Charles Darwin, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Penguin 2003) (1859).
37. Ian Taylor, Paul Walton & Jock Young, THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY: FOR A SOCIAL THEORY OF DEVIANCE 38-40 (1973).
38. Hans von Hentig, The Limits of Deterrence, 29 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 555 (1938).
39. Id. at 557-60.
40. Id. at 560.
41. Id. at 561.
42. Id. at 559 (emphasis omitted).
43. Jackson Toby, Is Punishment Necessary?, 55 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 332 (1964).
44. Id. at 333 (citing ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 89 (1947)).
45. Id. at 333-34.
46. James B. Appel & Neil J. Peterson, What's Wrong with Punishment?, 56 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 450 (1965).
47. Id. at 452-53.
48. Id. at 453.
49. Johs Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 176 (1952).
50. Id. at 177.
51. Id. at 179.
52. Id. at 179-180.
53. Id. at 175.
54. Id. at 180.
55. Id. at 193.
56. Id. at 197.
57. Joseph G. Green, Jr., Periodical Review, 14 AM. CATHOLIC SOC. REV. 57, (1953). (reviewing Andenaes, supra note 55).
58. John C. Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347 (1955).
59. Id. at 347-48.
60. Id. at 348.
61. Ball, supra note 65, at 351.
62. C. R. Jeffery, Criminal Behavior and Learning Theory, 56 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 294, (1965). A paper by Schmideberg published in the Journal five years before Jeffery's also presented a staunch defense for the use of punishment for deterrent purposes.
63. Melitta Schmideberg, The Offender's Attitude Toward Punishment, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 328 (1960).
64. Jeffery, supra note 71, at 294.
65. Id. at 294-295.
66. Id. at 299.
67. See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, in 23 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998);
68. Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 JUST. Q. 173 (1987).
69. There was, however, excellent empirical research on the deterrent effect of capital punishment on homicide rates. See Thorsten Sellin, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959). Even those who argued that capital punishment was not an effective deterrent acknowledged that this does not necessarily mean that other types of punishment are not capable of deterring.
70. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 170 (1968).
71. Jack P. Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 48 SOUTHWESTERN SOC. SCI. Q. 515, 515-16 (1968).
72. See generally Jack P. Gibbs, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE (1975);
73. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973);
74. Nagin, supra note 77.
75. Paternoster, supra note 77.
76. Becker, supra note 79, at 170.
77. Id. at 176.
78. Id. at 177-78.
79. Id. at 178.
80. See generally BENTHAM, supra note 3.
81. Gibbs, supra note 80.
82. Id. at 523-25.
83. Id. at 519-20.
84. Id. at 524-25.
85. For descriptions of this research, see GIBBS, supra note 81;
86. ZIMRING and HAWKINS, supra note 81;
87. Nagin, supra note 77.
88. Paternoster, supra note 77.
89. See generally Nagin, supra note 77.
90. See GIBBS, supra note 81;
91. ZIMRING and HAWKINS, supra note 81.
92. GIBBS, supra note 81, at 115.
93. See, e.g., Gibbs, supra note 80;
94. Charles H. Logan, General Deterrent Effects of Imprisonment, 51 SOC. FORCES 64 (1972);
95. Charles R. Tittle, Crime Rates and Legal Sanctions, 16 SOC. PROBS. 409 (1969).
96. Michael R. Geerken & Walter R. Gove, Deterrence: Some Theoretical Considerations, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 497 (1975);
97. see also Gordon P. Waldo & Theodore G. Chiricos, Perceived Penal Sanction and Self-Reported Criminality: A Neglected Approach to Deterrence Research, 19 SOC. PROBS. 522 (1972).
98. GIBBS, supra note 81, at 15-16.
99. See, e.g., Waldo and Chiricos, supra note 96;
100. Linda Saltzman et al., Deterrent and Experiential Effects: The Problem of Causal Order in Perceptual Deterrence Research, 28 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 172 (1982);
101. Maynard L. Erickson, Jack P. Gibbs & Gary F. Jensen, The Deterrence Doctrine and the Perceived Certainty of Legal Punishments, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 305 (1977);
102. Thomas Loughran et al., Reassessing the Certainty Effect in Deterrence Theory: Insights From Prospect Theory (Jan. 25, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
103. See GIBBS, supra note 81, at 2.
104. Id. at 2.
105. Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Critical Review, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REV 545, 561-66 (1986).
106. Id. at 558-61.
107. See CORNISH and CLARKE, supra note 32.
108. Pamela Lattimore & Ann Witte, Models of Decision Making Under Uncertainty: The Criminal Choice, in THE REASONING CRIMINAL 129, supra note 32, at 131-34.
109. Ball, supra note 65, at 351.
110. DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AS CRIME PREVENTION: RECONSIDERING THE PROSPECT OF SANCTION 15-23 (2008);
111. ZIMRING and HAWKINS, supra note 81, at 106-08.
112. See generally BENTHAM, supra note 3;
113. GIBBS, supra note 81;
114. ZIMRING and HAWKINS, supra note 81.
115. See Taylor et al., supra note 42, at 24-26.
116. Lattimore and Witte, supra note 104.
117. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 1-2.
118. The fact that most crime can be explained as rational and self-interested behavior does not mean that all crime has to be so explained in order for the theory to be valid. Some crimes are committed by people who are under the influence of strong compulsions or emotional forces that co-opt or minimize rational thinking. See Daniel Ariely & George Loewenstein, The Heat of the Moment: The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Sexual Decision Making, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 87 (2006) (showing the effect of emotions on decision making);
119. George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272 (1996) (same).
120. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 2-3.
121. GIBBS, supra note 81, at 5.
122. ZIMRING and HAWKINS, supra note 81, at 1-9.
123. GIBBS, supra note 81, at 5.
124. Id. at 8.
125. See generally id.; KENNEDY, supra note 107;
126. Mark A.R. Kleiman, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS PUNISHMENT (2009).
127. William N. Evans & Emily G. Owens, COPS and Crime, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 181, 182 (2007).
128. KENNEDY, supra note 107, at 10, 13.
129. BENTHAM, supra note 3, at 43.
130. GIBBS, supra note 81, at 7.
131. Id. at 115.
132. Id. at 5.
133. See Nagin, supra note 77, at 26
134. KENNEDY, supra note 118, at 9-14
135. Nagin, supra note 77, at 5-6.
136. Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 1-12 (2000).
137. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES-2001: SECTION 2: CRIME INDEX OFFENSES REPORTED 64 tbl.1 (2002), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/01crime2.pdf.
138. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE (2007).
139. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
140. BRIAN A. REAVES & MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICE DEPARTMENTS IN LARGE CITIES, 1990-2000 (2002).
141. Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSPS. 163, 177 (2004).
142. Christopher S. Koper & Evan Mayo-Wilson, Police Crackdowns on Illegal Gun Carrying: A Systematic Review of Their Impact on Gun Crime, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 227, 228-51 (2006);
143. Leavitt, supra note 132, at 172.
144. See JOHN ECK & EDWARD R. MAGUIRE, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime?: An Assessment of the Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000).
145. James Q. Wilson & Barbara Boland, The Effect of the Police on Crime, 12 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 367 (1978).
146. Id. at 372-74.
147. Id. at 375-76.
148. Id. at 378.
149. Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 163, 169 (1988).
150. Id. at 175-83.
151. Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Specification Problems, Police Levels, and Crime Rates, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 609, 623 (1996);
152. Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270, 271 (1997).
153. Marvell and Moody, supra note 142, at 630.
154. Id. at 632.
155. Steven D. Levitt, supra note 142, at 280-83 tbl.5 (1997).
156. Steven D. Levitt, Reply, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime: Reply, 92 AM. ECON. REV.1244, 1245, 1248-49 tbls.3 & 4 (2002).
157. See ZIMRING, supra note 129, at 137 fig.6.1, 145 fig.6.5, 149 fig.6.7.
158. See id. at 149 fig.6.7.
159. Id. at 149-52.
160. Id. at 156-58.
161. Id. at 168.
162. Hope Corman & H. Naci Mocan, A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence, and Drug Abuse in New York City, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 584, 586-87 (2000).
163. Id. at 595-601.
164. Richard Rosenfeld et al., Did Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile Reduce Homicide?, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 419, 428 (2005).
165. Id. at 431, 432 fig.1.
166. See id. at 431-33.
167. Evans and Owens, supra note 119, at 181.
168. Id. at 195-99 tbls.5 & 6.
169. Id. at 195.
170. Levitt, supra note 132, at 1877.
171. Id. at 177.
172. ECK and MAGUIRE, supra note 134.
173. Id. at 217.
174. See generally David M. Kennedy, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION: RECONSIDERING THE PROSPECT OF SANCTION (2009);
175. Mark A.R. Kleiman, The Effect of Intensive Enforcement on Retail Heroin Dealing, in STREET-LEVEL DRUG ENFORCEMENT: EXAMINING THE ISSUES 3 (Marcia R. Chaiken ed., 1988);
176. Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence, in 12 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1990);
177. Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing for Crime Prevention, in EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME PREVENTION 295 (Lawrence W. Sherman et al. eds., 2002);
178. Anthony A. Braga, Hot Spots Policing and Crime Prevention: A Systematic Review of Randomized Controlled Trials, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 317 (2005);
179. Christopher S. Koper & Evan Mayo-Wilson, Police Crackdowns on Illegal Gun Carrying: A Systematic Review of Their Impact on Gun Crime, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 227 (2006);
180. David Weisburd, Hot Spots Policing Experiments and Criminal Justice Research: Lessons from the Field, 599 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 220 (2005);
181. Mark A. R. Kleiman, Bringing Back Street-Level Heroin Enforcement (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Mgmt., Working Paper No. 80-01-08, 1986).
182. KENNEDY, supra note 166, at 10-11.
183. Richard A. Berk, Reaction Essay, Knowing When to Fold'Em: An Essay on Evaluating the Impact of Ceasefire, Compstat, and Exile, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 451 (2005);
184. Rosenfeld et al., supra note 154.
185. For an example, see the evaluations of the Boston youth violence crackdown known as Operation Ceasefire. See KENNEDY, supra note 166, at 8;
186. Berk, supra note 169, at 455-59.
187. Rosenfeld et al., supra note 154, at 434-35.
188. David Weisburd & John E. Eck, What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 52 (2004).
189. David Weisburd et al., Does Crime Just Move around the Corner?: A Controlled Study of Spatial Displacement of Crime Control Benefits, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 549 (2006).
190. Nagin, supra note 77, at 9-11.
191. ZIMRING, supra note 129, at 149-52.
192. See REAVES and HICKMAN, supra note 131.
193. Id. app. A at 10, app. D at 13.
194. William K. Rashbaum, Retired Officers Raise Questions on Crime Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, at A1.
195. Complaints about police officials lowering crime by cooking the books have been made about other city police departments such as Atlanta, Baltimore, Dallas, New Orleans, and Washington.
196. Rashbaum, supra note 180, at A1.
197. Sara Beattie & Amy Mole, CANADIAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS, POLICE RESOURCES IN CANADA, 2007 15 (2007);
198. see also ZIMRING, supra note 129, at 107-34.
199. Zimring, supra note 129, at 16 tbl 1.3.
200. BEATTIE and MOLE, supra note 186, at 108 fig.5.1.
201. Id. at 15.
202. ZIMRING, supra note 129, at 131-32.
203. Levitt, supra note 132, at 177.
204. Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q. J. ECON. 319 (1996).
205. Id. at 330-44, 348.
206. Id. at 345-46.
207. William Spelman, What Recent Studies Do (and Don't) Tell Us About Imprisonment and Crime, 27 CRIME & JUST. 419, 485 (2000).
208. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORTED CRIME IN UNITED STATES-TOTAL, http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/statebystaterun.cfm?stateid=52 (last visited July 9, 2010) (crime data);
209. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TOTAL CORRECTIONAL POPULATION, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=11 (last visited July 9, 2010) (incarceration data).
210. See generally BLUMSTEIN and WALLMAN, supra note 128.
211. Spelman, supra note 195, at 109.
212. Levitt, supra note 132, at 178-79.
213. Marc Mauer, The Hidden Problem of Time Served in Prison, 74 SOC. RES. 701, 701-02 (2007);
214. see also Steven D. Levitt, Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 353 (1998).
215. SARA JOHNSON, CANADIAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS, ADULT CORRECTIONAL SERVICES IN CANADA (2004), available at http://dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/ Pilot/Statcan/85-002-XIE/0100485-002-XIE.pdf.
216. Ball, supra note 65, at 351.
217. Phillip Cook, Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the Second Decade, in 2 CRIME & JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 211, 222 (Norval Morris & Michael Tonry eds., 1980).
218. See CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, DETERRENT EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (1968);
219. Zimring and Hawkins, supra note 81, at 143.
220. David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the Pickpocket's Hanging, 4 AM L. & ECON. REV 295, 305 (2002).
221. See NEAL SHOVER, GREAT PRETENDERS: PURSUITS AND CAREERS OF PERSISTENT THIEVES 151-74 (1996);
222. KENNETH D. TUNNELL, CHOOSING CRIME: THE CRIMINAL CALCULUS OF PROPERTY OFFENDERS 60-85 (1992);
223. RICHARD T. WRIGHT & SCOTT H. DECKER, BURGLARS ON THE JOB: STREETLIFE AND RESIDENTIAL BREAK-INS 127-33 (1994);
224. RICHARD T. WRIGHT & SCOTT H. DECKER, ARMED ROBBERS IN ACTION: STICKUPS AND STREET CULTURE 59-60 (1997).
225. Kent A. McClelland & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Factor Analysis Applied to Magnitude Estimates of Punishment Seriousness: Patterns of Individual Differences, 1 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 307, 309-10 (1985).
226. Id. at 311-14.
227. See Eleni Apospori & Geoffrey Alpert, Research Note, The Role of Differential Experience with the Criminal Justice System for Changes in Perceptions of Severity of Legal Sanctions over Time, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 184, 189 (1993).
228. Irving Piliavin et al., Crime, Deterrence, and Rational Choice, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 101, 114 (1986).
229. Julie Horney & Ineke Haen Marshall, Risk Perceptions Among Serious Offenders: The Role of Crime and Punishment, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 586 (1992).
230. Gary Kleck et al., The Missing Link in General Deterrence Research, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 623 (2005).
231. Id. at 635-36.
232. Id. at 634.
233. Id. at 635.
234. Id. at 633-34
235. Id. at 642.
236. Id. at 643 tbl.2.
237. Id. at 645-51 tbls.3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9.
238. Id. at 647 tbl.5.
239. Lance Lochner, Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 444, 445 (2007).
240. Id. at 444.
241. Id. at 450.
242. Id. at 449 tbl.2.
243. Id. at 452 tbl.4
244. Piliavin, supra note 211, at 111 tbl.4.
245. Horney and Marshall, supra note 212, at 584 tbl.2.
246. Kleck et al., supra note 213, at 647 tbl.5.
247. Lochner, supra note 224, at 227.
248. The models of Matsueda et al. are also consistent with Horney and Marshall's, Lochner's, and Kleck's in that the amount of explained variance of perceptions of punishment were low (ranging between 0.03 and 0.26), even with lagged values of the dependent variable in the model. Ross Matsueda et al., Deterring Delinquents: A Rational Choice Model of Theft and Violence, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 95, 108-09 tbl.2 (2006).
249. Wandi Bruine de Bruin et al., Can Adolescents Predict Significant Life Events?, 41 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 208 (2007);
250. Baruch Fischhoff et al., Teen Expectations for Significant Life Events, 64 PUB. OPINION Q. 189 (2000);
251. Michael Schoenbaum, The Accuracy of Teens' Expectations of Future Smoking, 28 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 274 (2005).
252. Nagin, supra note 77, at 17.
253. Saltzman et al., supra note 98, at 180-84
254. See Horney & Marshall, supra note 212, at 584 tbl.2;
255. Lochner, supra note 224, at 454 tbl.5;
256. Matsueda et al., supra note 232, at 111.
257. Contrary evidence was found by Pogarsky and colleagues who reported that those who had experienced an arrest had lower perceptions of the risk of punishment compared with those not arrested. They analogized this to the gambler's fallacy whereby once arrested, offenders think that they are due a streak of good luck before the next arrest. Greg Pogarsky & Alex R. Piquero, Can Punishment Encourage Offending? Investigating the 'Resetting' Effect, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 92 (2003);
258. Greg Pogarsky et al., Modeling Change in Perceptions about Sanction Threats: The Neglected Linkage in Deterrence Theory, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 343 (2004).
259. Lochner, supra note 224, at 456 tbl.6 (presenting results for male offenders).
260. Shamena Anwar & Thomas A. Loughran, Testing a Bayseian Learning Theory of Deterrence among Serious Juvenile Offenders (Apr. 1 2010) (unpublished, on file with author).
261. Id. at 23.
262. Id. at 28.
263. Id. at 30.
264. Id. at 30-32.
265. Levitt, supra note 201, at 353.
266. Anwar and Loughran, supra note 239, at 28.
267. See Waldo and Chiricos, supra note 96, at 522-28.
268. There is virtually no research on the role of the swiftness or celerity of punishment on self-reported crime. See Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865 (2001) (providing a recent exception). This is another one of the gaping holes in deterrence research. This may be due to the fact that it is not entirely clear which direction the deterrence hypothesis would predict. Early deterrence theorists like Beccaria clearly argued that punishment must be swift in order to be effective because when the length of time that passes between punishment and the misdeed is less, so much the stronger and more lasting in the human mind is the association of these two ideas, crime and punishment; they then come insensibly to be considered, one as the cause, the other as the necessary inevitable effect.
269. BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 56 (emphasis omitted).
270. Empirical work by Loewenstein however, questions this. George Loewenstein, Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption, 97 ECON. J. 666 (1987). Findings from some of his experiments suggest that, given the choice, people would like to get their punishment over as quickly as possible and that punishment delayed is seen as more costly than if given immediately.
271. Id. at 667-69.
272. See Waldo and Chicoros, supra note 96, at 525-27.
273. For a review, see Paternoster, supra note 77.
274. Saltzman et. al., supra note 233, at 180-84
275. For reviews, see Nagin, supra note 234, at 12-16;
276. Paternoster, supra note 248, at 185 tbl.3;
277. Travis Pratt et al., The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis, in TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 367, 383 (Francis T. Cullen et al. eds., 2006).
278. See Paternoster, supra note 77, at 191-94
279. Matsueda et al., supra note 232, at 103.
280. Id. at 114-15 tbl.3.
281. Id. at 117.
282. Lochner, supra note 224, at 444.
283. Id. at 457.
284. Id. at 458.
285. Id. at 454 tbl.5.
286. Id. at 457-58.
287. Id. at 458.
288. Loughran et al., supra note 98.
289. Id. at 13.
290. Id. at 14.
291. Id. at 16-18.
292. Id. at 18.
293. Id. at 20.
294. Id. at 21.
295. In addition, if perceptions are not stable over time, then the longer the lag between the measurement of perceptions and behavior the greater the possibility of measurement error which would bias any observed relationship to zero.
296. See Nagin, supra note 77, for a review.
297. Nagin and Pogarsky, supra note 246.
298. Id. at 872.
299. There is no theoretical reason why this has to be true, and Loewenstein has empirically found evidence for the counter position that persons would prefer to get their punishment over quickly rather than have it delayed. Loewenstein, supra note 246, at 667-68. The idea that punishment which is to be delivered later is actually perceived to be more painful is consistent with the concept of dread.
300. Id. at 667.
301. The notion of dread makes things conceptually messy for deterrence theory because while there is an empirical basis for thinking that gains are discounted in the future, we have no knowledge as to whether or not this is symmetric with respect to losses.
302. Nagin and Pogarsky, supra note 246, at 872.
303. Cook, supra note 204, at 232-33.
304. Nagin and Pogarsky, supra note 246, at 872.
305. Loewenstein, supra note 246, at 667-68.
306. Nagin and Pogarsky, supra note 246, at 874-874.
307. Id. at 872-84.
308. Nagin, supra note 77, at 15.
309. Pratt et al., supra note 251, at 383.
310. See Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, in 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 143 (Michael Tonry ed., 2003);
311. Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 115 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009).
312. In addition to the work on the specific deterrent effect of imprisonment, space prevented the review of other literatures that speak to the possibility of a deterrent effect. For example, one important but unaddressed issue is whether or not there is a marginal deterrent effect as one transitions from the juvenile justice system to the adult system. There is evidence in favor of deterrence from studies that show a sharp drop in crime when youth reach the age of adulthood and move from the very much more lenient juvenile justice system to the more punitive adult justice system.
313. Steven D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1156 (1998). However, while Hjalmarsson found that the perceived risk of arrest and punishment increases at the age of majority, there was no consistent relationship between this increased perception of risk and self-reportedinvolvement in criminal behavior.
314. Randi Hjalmarsson, Crime and Expected Punishment: Changes in Perception at the Age of Criminal Majority, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 209, 240-44 (2009). There is also evidence counter to deterrence theory which fails to show that permissible concealed gun laws have a negative impact on crime.
315. Jens Ludwig, Gun Self-Defense and Deterrence, in 27 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 363 (Michael Tonry ed., 2000). Finally, there is an abundant literature on whether or not the death penalty is an effective deterrent to homicide with strong statements by some that it is a very effective deterrent, while others offer compelling grounds to think that it really has no effect.
316. See generally Ethan Cohen-Cole et al., Model Uncertainty and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 335 (2009);
317. John J. Donahue & Justin Wolfers, Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on Murder, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 249 (2009);
318. John J. Donahue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005);
319. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2005).
320. Special thanks to Shawn Bushway for hammering this point into my head as only he can.
321. Cf. Doob & Webster, supra note 285.
322. See generally Devah Pager, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007);
323. Shawn D. Bushway, The Impact of Arrest on the Job Stability of Young White American Men, 35 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 454 (1998);
324. Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Market Effect of Permitting Employers Access to Criminal History Records, 20 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 276 (2004);
325. Christopher Uggen et al., Citizenship and Reintegration: The Socioeconomic, Familial, and Civic Lives of Criminal Offenders, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 281 (2006).
326. See, e.g., von Hentig, supra note 43.
327. BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 55.
328. Id. at 57.
329. Id. at 56.
330. Von Hentig, supra note 43, at 559 (emphasis omitted).
331. Brian Kuntson et al., Neural Predictors of Purchases, 53 NEURON 147 (2007);
332. Scott Rick et al., Tightwads and Spendthrifts, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 767, 768 (2007).
333. Knutson et al., supra note 295, at 151-52;
334. Rick et al., supra note 295, at 767-69.
335. Von Hentig, supra note 43, at 559.
336. Jeffery, supra note 71, at 299 (emphasis added).
337. BECCARIA, supra note 2, at 93-98.
338. Cook, supra note 204, at 232-33.
339. McClelland and Alpert, supra note 208, 311 tbl.1.