When does it pay to delay supplier qualification? Theory and experiments

Management Science

Volumn 58, Issue 11, 2012, Pages 2057-2075

  Wan, Zhixi ^a   Beil, Damian R ^b   Katok, Elena ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Experiments; Procurement auctions; Supplier qualification

Indexed keywords

ANALYTICAL RESULTS; DOMINANT STRATEGY; HOLD UP; HUMAN SUBJECTS; OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGY; OPTIMAL STRATEGIES; PROCUREMENT AUCTION; PROFIT MARGIN; REVERSE AUCTION; SITE VISITS; STRATEGIC CHOICE; SUPPLIER QUALIFICATION; THEORETICAL PREDICTION;

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; COSTS; EXPERIMENTS; PROFITABILITY;

SALES;

EID: 84870174189     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1539     Document Type: Article

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