To tax, to spend, to regulate

Harvard Law Review

Volumn 126, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 83-116

  Metzger, Gillian E ^a  

^a Columbia Law School ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COMMERCIAL PHENOMENA; FORECASTING; GOVERNMENT REGULATION; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HUMAN; JURISPRUDENCE; LEGAL ASPECT; POLITICS; ROLE PLAYING; TAX; UNITED STATES; LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE;

COMMERCE; FORECASTING; GOVERNMENT REGULATION; HEALTH CARE REFORM; HUMANS; PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT; POLITICS; ROLE; SUPREME COURT DECISIONS; TAXES; UNITED STATES;

EID: 84869801819     PISSN: 0017811X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (179)

1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Supreme Court Ruling on the Affordable Care Act (June 28, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/28/remarks-president-supreme-court-ruling-affordable-care-act ("[T]oday's decision was a victory for people all over this country whose lives will be more secure because of this law....").
3. See, e.g., Speaker of the House John Boehner, Remarks on CBS's Face the Nation (July 1, 2012), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464563/face-the-nation-transcripts-july-1-2012-speaker-boehner-senators-schumer-and-coburn-governors-walker-and-omalley ("This is government taking over the entire health insurance industry.").
4. See, e.g., Paul Brest et al., Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking33-37, 261-68 (5th ed. 2006) (recounting disagreement between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton over the constitutional propriety of a national bank and discussing debates over the constitutionality of secession).
5. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125, 127-28 (1942).
6. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to enact a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence).
7. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
8. See Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in Poll, N.Y. Times, June 8, 2012, at A1 (reporting decline in public approval of the Court, with threequarters of those polled saying Justices sometimes decide cases based on personal or political views).
9. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600 (upholding the individual mandate under the tax power).
10. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600 (upholding the individual mandate under the tax power).
11. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600 (upholding the individual mandate under the tax power).
12. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600 (upholding the individual mandate under the tax power).
13. See, e.g., Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS News (July 1, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law.
14. And no doubt there will be similar debates over whether the Chief Justice really did switch, and the reasons for his switch, as there are about the earlier Justice Roberts. Compare WilliamE. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn 142-43 (1995), with BarryCushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court 18-24, 30-32 (1998). For an excellent account of the debate, see Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 Am. Hist. Rev. 1052 (2005).
15. And no doubt there will be similar debates over whether the Chief Justice really did switch, and the reasons for his switch, as there are about the earlier Justice Roberts. Compare WilliamE. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn 142-43 (1995), with BarryCushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court 18-24, 30-32 (1998). For an excellent account of the debate, see Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 Am. Hist. Rev. 1052 (2005).
16. And no doubt there will be similar debates over whether the Chief Justice really did switch, and the reasons for his switch, as there are about the earlier Justice Roberts. Compare WilliamE. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn 142-43 (1995), with BarryCushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court 18-24, 30-32 (1998). For an excellent account of the debate, see Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 Am. Hist. Rev. 1052 (2005).
17. And no doubt there will be similar debates over whether the Chief Justice really did switch, and the reasons for his switch, as there are about the earlier Justice Roberts. Compare WilliamE. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn 142-43 (1995), with BarryCushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court 18-24, 30-32 (1998). For an excellent account of the debate, see Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 Am. Hist. Rev. 1052 (2005).
18. And no doubt there will be similar debates over whether the Chief Justice really did switch, and the reasons for his switch, as there are about the earlier Justice Roberts. Compare WilliamE. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn 142-43 (1995), with BarryCushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court 18-24, 30-32 (1998). For an excellent account of the debate, see Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 Am. Hist. Rev. 1052 (2005).
19. And no doubt there will be similar debates over whether the Chief Justice really did switch, and the reasons for his switch, as there are about the earlier Justice Roberts. Compare WilliamE. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn 142-43 (1995), with BarryCushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court 18-24, 30-32 (1998). For an excellent account of the debate, see Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 Am. Hist. Rev. 1052 (2005).
20. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, We Lost. But the Constitution Didn't., Wash. Post, July 1, 2012, at B1.
21. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
22. See Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401 (2009).
23. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2579-80.
24. Dean Martha Minow captures this dynamic with her apt description of the Chief Justice's opinion as a convergence of the views of Justice Ginsburg, who comes down on the side of congressional deference, and the joint dissent, which was marked by insistence on judicial supremacy. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term-Comment: Affordable Convergence: "Reasonable Interpretation" and the Affordable Care Act, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 117, 132 (2012). Although unlike Minow I view the Chief Justice's opinion as a compromise, I agree that both of these principles lie at the opinion's core.
25. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The June Surprises: Balls, Strikes, and the Fog of War, SCOTUSblog (Aug. 2, 2012, 12:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/the-june-surprises-balls-strikes-and-the-fog-of-war.
26. This information is based on a review of the briefs filed in the case, which may be accessed at ACA Litig. blog, http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
27. See, e.g., Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting claim that Congress invoked its tax power in adopting the mandate).
28. This information is based on a review of the oral argument audio and transcripts, which can be found at The Affordable Care Act Cases, Oyez, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011 _11_400 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
29. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2655 (joint dissent) (noting particularly limited briefing on the direct tax question).
30. Roger H. Brown, Redeeming the Republic 3 (1993) ("The experience with the breakdown of taxation... drove the constitutional Revolution of 1787. ").
31. Roger H. Brown, Redeeming the Republic 3 (1993) ("The experience with the breakdown of taxation... drove the constitutional Revolution of 1787. ").
32. The Federalist No. 30, at 184 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
33. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
34. Dean Martha Minow captures this dynamic with her apt description of the Chief Justice's opinion as a convergence of the views of Justice Ginsburg, who comes down on the side of congressional deference, and the joint dissent, which was marked by insistence on judicial supremacy. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term-Comment: Affordable Convergence: "Reasonable Interpretation" and the Affordable Care Act, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 117, 132 (2012). Although unlike Minow I view the Chief Justice's opinion as a compromise, I agree that both of these principles lie at the opinion's core.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950) ("[I]n conferring power upon Congress to tax... the Constitution delegates a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated, and one not restricted by them.... ").
36. See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.) (suggesting that only two kinds of taxes-capitation taxes and taxes on land-constituted direct taxes).
37. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
38. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
39. Constantine, 296 U.S. at 295.
40. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
41. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
42. Michelle Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State, 23 Law & Hist. Rev. 387, 88 (2005) (quoting Frances Perkins, Address Delivered at Social Security Headquarters in Baltimore, Md.: The Roots of Social Security (Oct. 23, 1962).
43. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2650-51 (joint dissent).
44. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2650-51 (joint dissent).
45. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2650-51 (joint dissent).
46. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2652-55 (joint dissent).
47. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2652-55 (joint dissent).
48. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 367 (1998) ("'[W]e must regard things rather than names' in determining whether an imposition on exports ranks as a tax. " (citation omitted) (quoting Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 376 (1876).
49. I cannot claim to be a neutral assessor here, because along with other constitutional law professors I filed a brief arguing that the presumption of constitutionality required the Court to uphold the mandate as a tax. See Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 19-33, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).
50. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513-16 (2009) (invoking "the principle of constitutional avoidance, " to resolve a constitutional challenge to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 with a statutory argument).
51. For example, all the Justices except for Justice Thomas signed on to the Chief Justice's opinion in NAMUDNO. See 129 S. Ct. at 2507.
52. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585-93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Justice Ginsburg's opinion demonstrates the deep flaws with this conclusion as a matter of constitutional text, original understanding, precedent, and economic reality.
53. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Essay, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 665, 669, 685-711 (2012) (noting the Court's recent proclivity for reaching constitutional issues, even when not raised by the parties in a case).
54. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
55. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
56. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997). I thank Trevor Morrison for this point.
57. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997). I thank Trevor Morrison for this point.
58. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
59. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2590 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
60. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), 5000A(d) (Supp. IV 2010) (listing narrow exemptions from the minimum coverage requirement for religion, illegal alien status, and incarceration). Even if the provision is read to reference only those who are currently uninsured, that still leaves a vast and disparate group. See Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Uninsured: A Primer 6-7 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451-07.pdf (noting that forty-five percent of the 49.1 million uninsured in 2011 were between the ages of thirtyfive and sixty-four and were also racially and socioeconomically diverse).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 18,091(2)(F) (Supp. IV 2010).
62. Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Health, United States, 2011, at 282 tbl.83 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data /hus/hus11.pdf.
63. Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Adults 125 tbl.37 (2010), available at http:// www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_249.pdf.
64. Although limiting the mandate in this fashion might create implementation problems, that possibility is also true of making the Medicaid expansion optional. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2664-66.
65. For discussion of the Court's facial treatment of Commerce Clause challenges, see David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 41, 47-53 (2006).
66. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 915, 923, 935-49 (2011). Chief Justice Roberts's approach thus may not be so unusual viewed broadly against the landscape of constitutional litigation, though the contrast with his own willingness to sever unconstitutional applications in the Medicaid context remains.
67. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647-48 (joint dissent).
68. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647-48 (joint dissent).
69. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647-48 (joint dissent).
70. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647-48 (joint dissent).
71. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647-48 (joint dissent).
72. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647-48 (joint dissent).
73. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647-48 (joint dissent).
74. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647-48 (joint dissent).
75. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647-48 (joint dissent).
76. Inconsistency between formalist and more pragmatic or functionalist analyses also characterizes separation of powers jurisprudence. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488 (1987).
77. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119-20 (1942).
78. See generally Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1089 (2000).
79. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2599-2600.
80. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 959, 961-69 (1997) (describing formalism of recent decisions striking down congressional measures on federalism grounds).
81. See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 129.
82. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2641 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (arguing that the coercion inquiry into the Medicaid expansion "involve[s] political judgments that defy judicial calculation").
83. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2641 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (arguing that the coercion inquiry into the Medicaid expansion "involve[s] political judgments that defy judicial calculation").
84. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
85. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) ("When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.
86. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
87. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
88. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
89. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
90. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
91. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2643 (joint dissent).
92. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 Duke L.J. 345, 372-74 (2008).
93. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing "threatened loss of over
94. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing "threatened loss of over
95. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing "threatened loss of over
96. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing "threatened loss of over
97. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing "threatened loss of over
98. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing "threatened loss of over
99. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing "threatened loss of over
100. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing "threatened loss of over
101. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing "threatened loss of over
102. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing "threatened loss of over
103. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing "threatened loss of over
104. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing "threatened loss of over
105. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (describing "threatened loss of over
106. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within [hardcore pornography].... But I know it when I see it.... ").
107. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
108. See Patrick McGuinn, The National Schoolmarm: No Child Left Behind and the New Educational Federalism, 35 Publius 41, 41-44 (2005) (describing NCLB in the context of federal education funding).
109. See Nat'l Ass'n of State Budget Officers, 2010 State Expenditure Report14, 16 (2011), available at http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/2010%20State%20Expenditure %20Report.pdf.
110. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 Duke L.J. 345, 372-74 (2008).
111. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 Duke L.J. 345, 372-74 (2008).
112. For a general articulation of how administrative law can substitute for direct enforcement of constitutional federalism constraints and of how the Supreme Court has used administrative law in this fashion, see Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 2023 (2008).
113. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 567, 610-19 (2011) [hereinafter Metzger, Federalism Under Obama] (discussing administrative avenues to addressing state interests under the ACA and other recent initiatives).
114. Cf. Va. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 569 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Luttig, J., dissenting) (arguing that a decision to terminate all of Virginia's funds under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act for failing to provide required services to less than one-tenth of one percent of eligible students was potentially coercive).
115. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-53, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments /argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf (containing the discussion of the taxing power).
116. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256, 1271-84 (2009) (describing instances of state resistance from within federal programs).
117. See Brief for Respondents at 41, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400) (stating that "the Secretary's withholding power remains largely untested" and noting that petitioners had not identified any instance of termination of a state's Medicaid funding for noncompliance).
118. See Jeffrey Toobin, Comment: To Your Health, The New Yorker (July 9, 2012), http:// www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2012/07/09/120709taco_talk_toobin ("[T]he key section of Roberts's opinion... was seemingly inspired more by Ayn Rand than by John Marshall....").
119. E.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ("Congress has never attempted... to compel individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product. ").
120. See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumptionof Liberty 259-60 (2004). Professor Barnett was the main originator of the argument that the mandate was unconstitutional because it represented congressional regulation of inactivity. See Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 581 (2010).
121. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
122. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
123. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
124. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
125. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
126. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
127. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
128. A similar resistance to government compulsion, particularly compulsion aimed at individuals, was evident in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289-91 (2012), which expressed doubt that a system that allows a union to use compulsory union dues and requires nonmembers to opt out of paying amounts that are used to pay for the union's political and ideological activities should be constitutional.
129. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596, 2599 (majority opinion).
130. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596, 2599 (majority opinion).
131. See Glen S. Krutz, Hitching a Ride 1-11 (2001) (describing the rise in omnibus legislation, particularly in conjunction with the budget process).
132. Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 1163, 1174 (1998).
133. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342, 373-404 (2004).
134. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1334 (1985), which defends market-based approaches.
135. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 289, 297-98 (1998).
136. See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 21, 22-26 (2001).
137. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(3), (8), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 83-87 (2006).
138. Ezra Klein, Unpopular Mandate: Why Do Politicians Reverse Their Positions?, NewYorker, June 25, 2012, at 30. The individual mandate was first proposed by Stuart Butler of the Heritage Foundation.
139. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 9-12, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).
140. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 567, 610-19 (2011) [hereinafter Metzger, Federalism Under Obama] (discussing administrative avenues to addressing state interests under the ACA and other recent initiatives).
141. See David M. Herszenhorn, A Grand Achievement, or a Lost Opportunity?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2010, at A21.
142. Zach Howard, New Bill Puts Vermont on Road to Single-Payer Health Care, Reuters (May 26, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/26/us-vermont-healthcare-idUSTRE74P61120110526.
143. See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 634-36, 640-41, 645 (1937) (upholding Social Security old age benefits and taxes as within Congress's powers).
144. See Martha Derthick, Policy Making for Social Security 213-368 (1979) (describing Social Security's combined reliance on ideas of equity and adequacy, with equity represented by the fact that individuals must contribute to receive benefits when they retire and adequacy by the fact that aged individuals receive minimum income and support necessary to meet their needs, and noting the increased emphasis on adequacy beginning with early amendments to the program).
145. Cf. Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw, Understanding Social Insurance: Fairness, Affordability, and the "Modernization" of Social Security and Medicare, 15 Elder L.J. 123, 124-26, 129-32 (2007) (contrasting the collective understanding of fairness that underlies social insurance with the individualistic understanding of fairness that underlies market-based proposals for Social Security).
146. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595-96.
147. See Michael Cooper, Many Governors Are Still Unsure About Medicaid Expansion, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2012, at A17.
148. The importance of financial incentives as a regulatory tool is evident in the long history of federal regulatory taxes and the growth in conditional spending over the last century. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (noting that federal grants to states and localities grew from $7 billion to $96 billion in the twenty-five years before 1985).
149. See Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 103, 115-17 (1998) (noting this trade-off aspect of market-based approaches, as evidenced by the possibility that a market-based system for emissions regulation may create hot spots of high pollution unless supplemented with other constraints).
150. Although money's centrality in these contexts was in part a reflection of the economic nature of the underlying problems, the federal government also leveraged its funds to achieve the specific outcomes it wanted and its broader policy goals. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 Admin. L. Rev. 463, 466-67, 518-23, 530-31, 536 (2009) (noting the federal government's use of financial leverage from control of government funds during the financial crisis).
151. See Thomas O. McGarity, Deregulatory Riders Redux, 1 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 33, 36-39, 51-70 (2012).
152. See Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 155, 189-197 (2000) (discussing the regulatory potential of contracts).
153. See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 Yale L.J. 815, 818 (2004).
154. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 663, 668-72 (2001) (describing federal reliance on the states to operate federal programs going back to the New Deal).
155. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act was not congruent and proportional to remedying unconstitutional discrimination against disabled individuals and exceeds Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
156. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 Ind. L.J. 459, 499-504 (2003).
157. See William T. Gormley, Jr., Money and Mandates: The Politics of Intergovernmental Conflict, 36 Publius 523, 527 tbl.1 (2006) (showing data demonstrating change in federal grants to the states in several policy areas from 1981-2005).
158. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 567, 610-19 (2011) [hereinafter Metzger, Federalism Under Obama] (discussing administrative avenues to addressing state interests under the ACA and other recent initiatives).
159. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 567, 610-19 (2011) [hereinafter Metzger, Federalism Under Obama] (discussing administrative avenues to addressing state interests under the ACA and other recent initiatives).
160. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596.
161. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 780-81 (1994) (noting that the high rate of a tax is relevant but not determinative in assessing whether the tax is punitive).
162. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
163. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 377, 379-81 (2005) (contending that limitations on commerce and spending powers could substantially impact federal environmental legislation, though environmental protection might benefit).
164. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting Congress's power to regulate intrastate economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce).
165. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 567, 610-19 (2011) [hereinafter Metzger, Federalism Under Obama] (discussing administrative avenues to addressing state interests under the ACA and other recent initiatives).
166. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
167. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
168. See generally Paul Starr, Remedy and Reaction (2011).
169. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942).
170. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g)(2) (2006) (granting the Secretary of Education discretion to withhold a state's federal education funding for failure to comply with the No Child Left Behind Act).
171. See Motoko Rich, 'No Child' Law Whittled Down by White House, N.Y. Times, July 6, 2012, at A1.
172. See Sean Cavanagh, NCLB Waivers Point to National Curriculum, Report Argues, Educ. Wk. (Feb. 10, 2012, 12:40 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2012/02 /nclb_waivers_encourage_national_curriculum_report_argues.html (noting critics' claim that both the NCLB waivers and the Race to the Top program pressure states to adopt multistate curriculum standards and tests).
173. Coercion likewise seems hard to claim under a competitive grant program like Race to the Top, where the very terms of the program underscore that no state can legitimately claim an entitlement to federal funds and grants can be made on a non-recurring basis. See generally Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, Competitive Grants and Educational Federalism: President Obama's Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice, 41 Publius 522 (2011).
174. For a discussion of the increasing use of waivers under the Obama Administration, see David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver (July 9, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
175. See Waivers, Medicaid. gov, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/Waivers.html?filterBy=1115#waivers (last visited September 29, 2012) (listing the states currently participating in the § 1115 program, which allows alternative approaches to Medicaid financing).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (Supp. IV 2010).
177. See Motoko Rich, 'No Child' Law Whittled Down by White House, N.Y. Times, July 6, 2012, at A1.
178. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 567, 610-19 (2011) [hereinafter Metzger, Federalism Under Obama] (discussing administrative avenues to addressing state interests under the ACA and other recent initiatives).
179. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 567, 610-19 (2011) [hereinafter Metzger, Federalism Under Obama] (discussing administrative avenues to addressing state interests under the ACA and other recent initiatives).