Pricing games and impact of private demand information in decentralized assembly systems

Operations Research

Volumn 60, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 1142-1156

  Kalkanci, Başak ^a   Erhun, Feryal ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Assembly system; Asymmetric demand information; Common agency framework; Complex contracts; Price only contracts; Procurement contracts

Indexed keywords

ASSEMBLY SYSTEMS; BASIC MODELS; COMMON AGENCY FRAMEWORK; COMPLETE INFORMATION; DEMAND INFORMATION; DEMAND VARIABILITY; HIGH DEMAND; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; INFORMATION STRUCTURES; MARGINAL VALUES; OPTIMAL CONTROLS; PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL; PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS; SOLUTION TECHNIQUES; STUDY CASE;

ASSEMBLY; COSTS; PROFITABILITY; RIVETING;

CUSTOMER SATISFACTION;

EID: 84869820936     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: 15265463     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1120.1084     Document Type: Article

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