The flattened firm: Not as advertised

California Management Review

Volumn 55, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 5-23

  Wulf, Julie ^a  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Corporate strategy; Decision making; Executive compensation; Organizational change; Organizational structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 84868355022     PISSN: 00081256     EISSN: 21628564     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/cmr.2012.55.1.5     Document Type: Article

References (33)

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30. We used the survey instrument developed and described in Oriana Bandiera, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat, and Raffaella Sadun, "What Do CEOs Do?" working paper, 2011. For details, go to http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/ ExecutiveTimeUse/.
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