The long and short of it: Closing the description-experience "gap" by taking the long-run view

Cognition

Volumn 126, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 54-71

  Camilleri, Adrian R ^a   Newell, Ben R ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

Broad bracketing; Description experience gap; Multi play; Rare events; Repeated play; Risky choice

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; MEDICAL LITERATURE; PERSONAL EXPERIENCE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RESPONSE TIME; TASK PERFORMANCE;

ADULT; CHOICE BEHAVIOR; EDUCATIONAL STATUS; FEMALE; GAMBLING; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HUMANS; INCOME; MALE; PSYCHOMOTOR PERFORMANCE; RECOGNITION (PSYCHOLOGY); RISK-TAKING;

EID: 84868354687     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: 18737838     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.09.001     Document Type: Article

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