Certainty of punishment versus severity of punishment: An experimental investigation

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 79, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 399-421

  Friesen, Lana ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84868333305     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.4284/0038-4038-2011.152     Document Type: Article

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